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Tillogical,

HE spinoff rules in § 355 and related sections are in many respects

complex and uncertain. The rules disqualify some transactions that logically should be permitted, and permit other transactions that logically should be disqualified. Moreover, the complexities
and uncertainties are so great that spinoff ruling requests are reported to
represent more than half the workload of the entire IRS corporate division.1 Congress, the Treasury Department and the IRS have devoted
considerable attention to spinoffs in recent years, yet few would say that
this has made the rules simpler, more rational or more certain.
There are several reasons for these problems. First, many of the spinoff rules were developed in an era when most corporations doing spinoffs were closely held and had simple corporate structures. Today
spinoffs are often done by large, publicly traded corporations with complex corporate structures. In fact, in recent years, spinoffs have become a
significant percentage of all public merger and acquisition activity.2 Second, most of the spinoff rules were designed for the pre-1986 era. At that
time, the concern was that spinoffs could improperly be used to convert
shareholder-level dividend income into capital gain. The rules were not
designed for the post-1986 era following the repeal of the General Utilities3 doctrine. Now, the concern is that spinoffs can improperly be used
to avoid corporate level capital gain on the distribution. Third, in light of
General Utilities repeal, enormous pressure has been put on the spinoff
rules because spinoffs are the principal remaining method for appreciated
assets to leave a corporate group without gain recognition.
This article suggests revisions to the spinoff rules that are intended to
eliminate unnecessary complexities and make the rules more consistent
with their purpose. To be sure, the purpose of the spinoff rules is in the
eye of the beholder, and different views of the purpose will lead to different proposals for reform. I believe the purpose of the rules is to allow a
single preexisting corporation or corporate group to be divided into parts
among its shareholders. The proposed revisions to the rules are intended
to be consistent with that purpose.
The suggested changes to the spinoff rules are intended to be an integrated package. As compared to the present rules, some of the proposals
1. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Landing on the Moon: IRS Chief Counsel's National Office, 93 TAX NOTES 1899, 1904 (2001).
2. See Robert Frank, More and More, Mergers of '90s Are Becoming Today's Spinoffs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at C1 (indicating that spinoffs constituted 20-35% of the
total merger and acquisition market over the 1996-2001 period).
3. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). See infra Part III
for further discussion of this issue.
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are pro-taxpayer and some are anti-taxpayer. A selective adoption of
some of the changes but not others could potentially leave the spinoff
rules either too broad and thus open to abuse by taxpayers, or more restrictive than necessary in light of their intended purpose.
In this article, P is a parent corporation spinning off a subsidiary S.
I.

REQUIREMENTS FOR A SPINOFF

Under § 355, if P distributes the stock of S to the P shareholders, and
certain conditions are satisfied, then (1) P does not recognize gain or loss
on the distribution, 4 and (2) the shareholders do not recognize gain or
loss on receipt of the S stock. 5 The conditions include:
6
1. The distribution must have a corporate business purpose.
2. The distribution cannot principally be a device for the distribution
7
of the earnings and profits of P or S.
3. The distribution must satisfy continuity of shareholder interest as
8
to both P and S.
4. P must control S immediately before the distribution. 9 Control for
purposes of the spinoff rules means ownership of 80% of the voting stock
and 80% of each class of nonvoting stock. 10
5. P must distribute either all the stock it held in S, or else stock representing control where the retention of stock does not have a tax avoidance motive.11
6. Each of P and S must be engaged, immediately after the distribution, in the active conduct of a trade or business (or substantially all its
12
assets must consist of stock of subsidiaries so engaged).
7. The relevant trade or business of each of P and S must have been
conducted for at least 5 years before the spinoff (although not necessarily
by P and S),13 cannot have been acquired by P or S within the 5-year
period in a transaction in which any gain or loss was recognized,' 4 and
cannot have been held (at the time of the acquisition) by a corporation
that was acquired by P or S within the 5-year period in a transaction in
15
which any gain or loss was recognized.
8. A corporate shareholder cannot have acquired control of P during
the preceding 5-year period in a transaction in which any gain or loss was
6
recognized.'
4. I.R.C. § 355(c)(1) (2002).

5. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1) (2002).
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (as amended in 1989).
7. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) (2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d) (2002).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1) (2002).
9. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(A) (2002).

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
Id.

§ 368(c) (2002).
§ 355(a)(1)(D) (2002).
§ 355(a)(1)(C), (b)(1), (b)(2)(A) (2002).
§ 355(b)(2)(B) (2002).
§ 355(b)(2)(C) (2002).
§ 355(b)(2)(D) (2002).
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Moreover, even if a distribution meets these requirements, it will not
be tax-free to P (although it will remain tax-free to the P shareholders) if
either of the following exists:
1. A person purchased P stock within 5 years preceding the distribution, and such stock either (1) represents 50% or more of the outstanding
P stock after the distribution, or (2) caused the purchaser to receive 50%
or more of the outstanding S stock in the distribution. 17
2. The distribution is part of a plan or series of related transactions
pursuant to which there is a 50% or greater change in ownership of P or
1
S. 8

In addition, § 368(a)(1)(D) provides for a "divisive D reorganization."
This occurs when (1) P transfers part of its assets to a new or preexisting
S, (2) P distributes S in a transaction qualifying under § 355, and (3) immediately after the distribution the preexisting shareholders of P control
S. The result is tax-free treatment to both P19 and the shareholders of
p.2o Thus, if P has a preexisting subsidiary S, and spins off S without
making any further contributions to S, the spinoff is solely under § 355. If
P contributes additional assets to S, or if P forms a new S and contributes
assets to S, the transaction can qualify as a divisive D reorganization.
Finally, a "spinoff" refers to a pro rata distribution by P of the stock of
S to all the P shareholders. A "splitoff" refers to P's use of S stock to
redeem a portion of the stock of P on a non-pro rata basis, so that some
shareholders of P end up with an interest in S and other shareholders of
P end up with an increased percentage interest in P. A "splitup" refers to
the case where P has no assets other than stock in two or more subsidiaries (or P contributes any other assets to such subsidiaries) and P then
liquidates, distributing the stock in its subsidiaries to its shareholders on
either a pro rata or non-pro rata basis.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPINOFFS

Congress first adopted corporate reorganization provisions in the Revenue Act of 1918, and made major amendments in the Revenue Acts of
1921 and 1924. By 1924, divisive D reorganizations were permitted,
whether they were in the form of spinoffs, splitoffs or splitups. 2 1 Distributions of these types that were not part of a reorganization were not
permitted. However, this restriction was not very meaningful because P
could spin off (or split off) a preexisting S by contributing the S stock to a
17. I.R.C. § 355(d) (2002).
18. I.R.C. § 355(e) (2002).
19. I.R.C. § 361(a) (2002) (relating to dropdown of assets and receipt of S stock);
I.R.C. § 361(c) (relating to distribution of S stock).
20. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1), (a)(2)(C) (2002).
21. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 68-179, at 14 (1924) (stating that a "common type of reorganization" occurs when P transfers some of its assets to new S and distributes the stock of
S as a dividend to its shareholders). For more details, see Charles S. Whitman III, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to CorporateSeparationsUnder the 1954 Code, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1194, 1198-200 (1968).
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newly formed company ("Newco") and then spinning off Newco. There
were no statutory requirements for a reorganization, the only rule being
that the distribution must be pursuant to a plan of reorganization.
The next major development occurred in 1932, when the Board of Tax
Appeals decided Gregory v. Helvering.22 There, the individual taxpayer
owned all of P, and P held appreciated stock. P contributed the stock to
a newly formed S, P spun off S, and S immediately liquidated. The taxpayer received the stock and immediately sold it. If the transaction qualified as a divisive D reorganization, the result was to convert dividend
income into capital gain. The court upheld this result based on the literal
language of the statute.
Congress considered this result abusive and, in the Revenue Act of
1934,23 repealed the spinoff form of divisive D reorganization. This may
have been an overreaction, because the Board of Tax Appeals decision
was ultimately reversed by the Second Circuit. 24 The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the claimed result was inconsistent with the
purpose of the statute and that the transaction was a "mere device. ' 25
Nevertheless, from 1934 to 1951 there was no spinoff form of divisive D
reorganization in the Code. However, the splitup form of divisive D reorganization apparently remained permissible, 26 making the lack of a spinoff provision hardly a major obstacle to the well advised taxpayer.
The Revenue Act of 195127 amended the 1939 Code to restore the spinoff form of divisive D reorganization. However, this Act imposed new
requirements that (1) P and S must have intended to continue the active
conduct of a trade or business after the spinoff, and (2) S was not "used
principally as a device for the distribution of earnings and profits. ' 28
These provisions were designed to prevent dividend-equivalent transactions, such as those in Gregory, from being done as spinoffs.
The 1954 Code 29 included § 355 in the same general form as it exists
today. For the first time, a spinoff (or splitoff or splitup) was allowed
outside the D reorganization context, so that a preexisting S could be
distributed without any prior transfer of assets from P to S. In addition,
regardless of the form of the transaction, the device test from 1951 was
adopted, the active business test from 1951 was adopted and strengthened, the 5-year active business tests were added, and the control test
was added.
No significant changes were made to the statute between 1954 and
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Gregory v. Helvering, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932).
Revenue Act of 1934, Ch. 277, § 112, 48 Stat. 680, 704-06 (1934).
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
Whitman, supra note 21, at 1201-02.
Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, 65 Stat. 452, 493-94 (1951).
Id.
I.R.C. § 355 (1954) (amended 1954).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

1987.30 The Revenue Act of 1987 (the 1987 Act) 3' amended
§ 355(b)(2)(D) to disqualify a spinoff under § 355 if a corporation had
acquired control of P within 5 years preceding the spinoff. The purpose
of this provision was to prevent a corporation from purchasing 80% of P
for cash, receiving stock of S in a spinoff in which the S stock would take
a substituted basis, and then selling the S stock at little or no gain.
Subsequently, § 355(d) was adopted in 1990.32 It applies, for example,
when X buys 40% of P stock for cash and, after a period of time to meet
continuity of interest, P splits off S by redeeming out all of the P stock
held by X. X obtains a basis in the S stock equal to X's cost for the P
stock. X can eventually sell the S stock at a reduced gain reflecting this
basis. A similar result would arise if P split off S by redeeming out all the
non-X shareholders of P, in which case X would own 100% of the smaller
P with a cost basis.
Finally, § 355(e) was adopted in 1997. 33 It was aimed at so-called Morris Trust34 transactions where the spinoff of S is followed by a third party
acquiring P (or sometimes S) in a tax-free reorganization. This section
was particularly aimed at leveraged spinoff transactions that were the economic equivalents of cash sales of assets, where the spinoff rules resulted in no taxable gain to the "seller. ' 35 However, the section applies
equally even in the absence of leverage.
III.

THE ROLE OF SPINOFFS AFTER
GENERAL UTILITIES REPEAL

In the Tax Reform Act of 198636 (the 1986 Act), Congress eliminated
most of the methods for a corporate group to transfer assets outside the
group without gain recognition. This set of amendments is generally referred to as the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. 37 In fact, after the
1986 Act, the principal remaining method of achieving this result is under
§ 355 (or a divisive D reorganization). This has caused taxpayers to at30. However, extensive changes were made in the regulations and significant case law
arose. See John W. Lee, The Art of Regulation Drafting: Structured DiscretionaryJustice
Under Section 355, 44 TAX NOTES 1029 (1989).
31. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330,
411-12 (1987).
32. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1338,
460-63 (1990).
33. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 1788, 914-16 (1997).
34. Comm'r v. Mary Archer W. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
35. Suppose P had two divisions (A and B), each with a basis of $0 and value of $100.
If X wanted to buy B, P would borrow $65, contribute the cash and A to new S,and spin
off S to its shareholders. X would then acquire P (holding B and having $65 of debt) for
$35 of X stock. S (holding A and $65 in cash, and renamed P) is in the same position as the
old P, as if old P had sold B for $100 and paid $35 in tax. Likewise, X is in the same
position as if it paid $100 ($65 in cash and $35 in stock) for B. However, no tax has been
paid and the B assets do not have a stepped-up tax basis. The $35 in tax savings has gone
to the old P shareholders in the form of X stock.
36. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
37. See George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquidations (and Related Matters) After the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 42 TAX L. REV. 575 (1987).
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tempt to stretch § 355 to its limits, and has put much pressure on the
requirements of § 355.
The most basic question is the proper role of § 355 after General Utilities repeal. This question has been much discussed, 38 and at one point the
Treasury Department was reportedly considering whether repeal was
39
appropriate.
It might be thought that § 355 is consistent with General Utilities repeal
because even though the S assets leave the P group, they remain in corporate solution and do not obtain a stepped up basis. As a result, the
argument runs, there is no reason for P to recognize gain as a result of a
spinoff. However, while a carryover basis in the S assets is necessary in
order for § 355 to be consistent with General Utilities repeal, this factor
alone is not sufficient. There are many reasons for this conclusion.
1. Before 1982, a corporation generally did not recognize gain when it
used stock of a subsidiary to redeem stock held by a shareholder. This
40
exception to the general recognition rule was mostly eliminated in 1982.
As a result, even before 1986, a corporation generally recognized gain on
the distribution of stock of a subsidiary to its shareholders, even though
the assets of the subsidiary retained a carryover basis. General Utilities
repeal Was intended to increase, rather than decrease, gain recognition to
a corporation on a distribution. As a result, Congress could not have
intended that a carryover basis of S assets would be sufficient for P to
avoid gain on a distribution of S stock.
2. If carryover basis is the key, a corporation should be allowed to sell
any of its assets for cash and not recognize gain, as long as the buyer
elected a carryover basis for the assets. Congress has never gone this far,
nor even seriously considered this result.
3. A well-respected ALI study in the early 1980s 4 1 considered far
reaching reform of the corporate income tax. However, even that study
did not suggest that a carryover asset basis should be sufficient to avoid
gain recognition. Rather, the study suggested that a selling corporation
should be permitted to avoid gain on asset sales only if (1) the assets
represented all or a major portion of the corporation's assets, and (2) the
corporation distributed the cash to its shareholders, resulting in immediate gain recognition at the shareholder level. 42 The purpose of the propo38. See, e.g., Michael L. Schultz, The Evolution of Continuity of Interest, General Utilities Repeal and the Taxation of Corporate Acquisitions, 80 TAXES 229 (2002); Jeffrey T.
Sheffield & Herwig J. Schlunk, Reconciling Spin-Offs with General Utilities Repeal, 74
TAXES 941 (1996); Melissa C. McCann, Section 355 in a Post-General Utilities World: The
Victim of an Overreaction?, 23 J. CORP. TAX'N 137 (1996); Karla W. Simon & Daniel L.
Simmons, The Future of Section 355, 40 TAX NOTES 291 (1988); Eric M. Zolt, The General
Utilities Doctrine: Examining the Scope of Repeal, 65 TAXES 419 (1987).
39. McCann, supra note 38, at 144.
40. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AcT oF
1982, at 129-31 (Comm. Print 1982).
41. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C,
PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS (1982).

42. Id. at 72-75, 94-99.
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sal was to avoid an immediate double tax as long as a current
shareholder-level tax was paid. The goal was not to permit the avoidance
of all current tax solely on account of the carryover asset basis.
4. The 1986 Act enacted new § 336(e). That section authorizes regulations to provide that, when P distributes the stock of S, an election can
be made to treat the distribution as an asset disposition with no gain to P
on the stock distribution. This provision demonstrates that Congress was
aware that P might be taxed on the transfer of S stock outside the corporate group even though the S assets retained a carryover basis. In fact, in
discussing the justification for § 336(e), the 1986 Blue Book explicitly recognizes that this is the appropriate result. 43 The solution was to allow an
election to recognize gain on the assets, not to provide that a carryover
asset basis was sufficient to avoid gain on the stock.
5. In the 1987 Act, Congress amended the Code in three respects to
stop transactions that allowed assets to leave a corporate group without
gain recognition to the group. The techniques were (a) mirror liquidations,4 4 (b) a technique involving § 304 that produced an artificial increase in the stock basis of a subsidiary that was to be sold, and (c) as
discussed above, 45 the purchase of 80% of the stock of a corporate parent
46
followed by the parent's distribution of subsidiary stock in a spinoff.
Even though the assets retained a carryover basis in each case, the legislative history refers to these techniques as "tax avoidance. ' 47 Moreover,
the legislative history makes clear that Congress rejected the concept that
a carryover of the underlying asset basis was sufficient to prevent corpo48
rate-level gain recognition.
43. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 338 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 1986 Blue Book]
("Congress believed it was appropriate to conform the treatment of liquidating and nonliquidating sales or distributions and to require recognition when appreciated property, including stock of a subsidiary, is transferred to a corporate or individual recipient outside
the economic unit of the selling or distributing affiliated group.") (emphasis added).
44. In a mirror liquidation, instead of corporation X directly buying the stock of corporation P for cash, (1) X would form a number of new wholly owned consolidated subsidiaries, (2) X would contribute the total purchase price for P to the new subsidiaries in a
predetermined manner, (3) the new subsidiaries would each purchase a predetermined
percentage of the stock of P,100% in the aggregate, and (4) P would liquidate into the
subsidiaries under § 332, relying on the former rule that for purposes of the 80% stock
ownership test in § 332, ownership by consolidated subsidiaries was aggregated. As a result, each new subsidiary would own a portion of the P assets with a carryover basis, but X
would own the stock of each subsidiary with a cost basis. X could then sell the stock of one
or more subsidiaries with no taxable gain.
45. See supra Part II (discussion of the 1987 Act):
46. See H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 1080-84 (1987); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-495, at
966-70 (1987).
47. H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 1080 (1987); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-495, at 966
(1987).
48. [Tlhe statute specifically rejects the concept that recognition can be deferred merely because the underlying assets of the subsidiary do not obtain a
stepped-up basis. This is because the potential for a corporate-level tax in
the future, resulting from the low basis of the assets, is not the economic
equivalent of a current tax on the appreciation at the time of the sale or
distribution .. . . [Section 355] might be used to claim a stepped-up, fair
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6. Congress subsequently thought it appropriate to adopt § 355(d)
and (e). These sections impose corporate level gain in cases where assets
leave the corporate group with a carryover basis. The legislative history
of § 355(d) makes it clear that Congress thought § 355(d) transactions
were inconsistent with General Utilities repeal. 49 The sections do not impose shareholder gain because Congress viewed the transactions in question as implicating General Utilities repeal but not the device test.
These consistent actions by Congress beginning with the 1986 Act
demonstrate that Congress did not intend a carryover asset basis to be
sufficient grounds to allow an asset to leave a corporate group without
gain recognition. Nevertheless, throughout this period, Congress did not
repeal § 355, despite the numerous opportunities. As a result, Congress
clearly intended the core of § 355 to remain.
If carryover basis is not the key to the retention of § 355, what is the
key? There is no clear answer in the legislative history to the 1986 Act.
However, the 1986 Blue Book has the best explanation. It states that:
Congress felt that the same policy rationale that justifies nonrecognition by the shareholder on receipt of the stock-namely, that the
transfer merely effects a readjustment of the shareholder's continuing interest in the corporation in modified form and subject to certain statutory and other constraints-also justifies nonrecognition of
gain (or loss) to the distributing corporation in this situation. Similarly, certain distributions pursuant
to a plan of reorganization also
50
are not subject to recognition.
Thus, a spinoff is simply "a readjustment of the shareholder's continuing interest in the corporation, '5 1 analogous to a reorganization. In other
words, if merging two corporations together is tax free, dividing a corporation into parts should also be tax free. This explanation would support
market value basis when a subsidiary of an acquired corporation is distributed to the acquiring corporation. The committee believes that section 355
of the Code should generally prevent the use of that section to accomplish a
sale of a recently distributed subsidiary (or its recently acquired parent) without corporate level tax, or effectively to accomplish a sale of a subsidiary to a
significant shareholder by a distribution with respect to recently purchased
stock.
H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 1081-83 (1987).
49. The Committee is concerned that some corporate taxpayers may attempt,
under present-law rules governing divisive transactions, to dispose of subsidiaries in transactions that resemble sales .. . .The avoidance of corporate
level tax is inconsistent with the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine ....
The provisions for tax-free divisive transactions under section 355 were a limited exception to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, intended to permit historic shareholders to continue to carry on their historic corporate
businesses in separate corporations.... The present-law provisions granting
tax-free treatment at the corporate level are particularly troublesome because they may offer taxpayers an opportunity to avoid the general rule that
corporate-level gain is recognized when an asset (including stock of a subsidiary) is disposed of.
H.R. REP. No. 101-881, at 341 (1990).
50. 1986 Blue Book, supra note 43, at 337.
51. Id.
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both a pro rata spinoff and a non-pro rata splitoff, and is consistent with
the history of § 355. As noted above, 52 spinoffs entered the Code as a
form of tax-free reorganization, and were subsequently considered to be
a form of reorganization. This history provides strong support for the
retention of § 355 after General Utilities repeal.
However, this is not to say that General Utilities repeal properly had no
effect on the theory of spinoffs. Before that time, the principal concern
was that spinoffs would be used to convert ordinary dividend income at
the shareholder level into capital gain. Since 1986, a second major concern is that spinoffs should not be used to circumvent the purposes of
General Utilities repeal. The purpose of the repeal is far from clear. At a
minimum, Congress has shown its belief that a buyer of stock of corporation X should not be able to convert its stock basis into a stepped-up basis
in stock of a corporation that holds only part of the X assets. This is so
even if the underlying assets retain a carryover basis.
A broader Congressional intent regarding General Utilities repeal is
demonstrated by the amendments to § 304 and § 355(e). The purpose of
the § 304 amendment was to prohibit a historic owner of stock of a subsidiary from artificially increasing the basis of the stock before it was sold.
Even more broadly, in § 355(e), Congress viewed a transaction as resembling a sale of assets if some of the assets in a corporate group leave the
group, and economic ownership of those assets (or of the remaining assets) is transferred to one or more third parties. 53 If the group does not
recognize a gain, the result is considered inconsistent with General Utilities repeal even if the assets retain a carryover basis. This issue is dis54
cussed further below.
The foregoing discussion provides insight into the requirements that
should be imposed for spinoffs.
1. Spinoffs generally should be subject to the requirements for taxfree reorganizations-the basis upon which they continue to exist.
2. Just as in the pre-1986 era, because spinoffs are inherently divisive,
additional restrictions should be required for spinoffs in order to prevent
them from converting shareholder dividend income into capital gain.
3. In light of General Utilities repeal, additional restrictions should be
required for spinoffs to prevent them from being used improperly to
avoid corporate level tax when assets leave the corporate group.
The remainder of this article considers the extent to which the spinoff
rules should be modified in order to make them simpler in practice and
more consistent with the purposes of § 355 following General Utilities
repeal.
52. See supra Part II.
53. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACrED IN 1997, at 198 (Comm. Print 1997) ("In cases in which it is intended that new shareholders will acquire ownership of a business in connection with a
spin-off, the transaction more closely resembles a corporate level disposition of the portion
of the business that is acquired.").
54. See infra Part V.B.1.

SPINOFFRULES

20031
IV.

RECONSIDERING THE SPINOFF TESTS
A.

BUSINESS PURPOSE

The Code does not expressly require that either a reorganization or a
spinoff have a business purpose. The regulations adopt a business purpose test for both reorganizations 55 and spinoffs. 56 This is certainly appropriate to prevent transactions such as that in Gregory v Helvering.
However, in contrast to the very general business purpose requirement
for a reorganization, the requirements for a spinoff are quite strict. The
business purpose must be a corporate business purpose 57 rather than a
shareholder purpose. In addition, the purpose does not qualify if the desired result could have been achieved without a spinoff in a manner that
is "neither impracticable nor unduly expensive." 58
Under published guidelines issued for advance ruling purposes, a taxpayer will satisfy the business purpose test for a spinoff if its business
purpose is on a list of approved purposes. 59 These purposes include the
need to issue stock to employees of P or S that reflects solely the performance of the particular business, cost savings, the desire of P or S to
to do busido business with competitors of the other who are not willing
'60
ness with an affiliate of a competitor, and "fit and focus."
In reality, many spinoffs involving public corporations are planned in
order to "enhance shareholder value."' 6' Corporate management often
believes that the market discounts the value of two disparate businesses
that operate as divisions of a single corporate group, and that once the
businesses are separated the aggregate stock price will increase. Regardless of the validity of this theory, this purpose is not on the approved list.
The IRS will consider ruling on business purposes not on the approved
list.62 However, as long as the IRS determines that an approved purpose
motivates the spinoff "in substantial part," it will issue a ruling without
regard to any other purposes for the spinoff. 63 Moreover, the IRS will
not rule on the purpose of enhancing shareholder value, apparently because it is considered an impermissible shareholder purpose rather than a
corporate business purpose. Rulings for other business purposes not on
the approved list are also difficult to obtain.
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (as amended in 2001); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c)
(stating that a reorganization "must be an ordinary and necessary incident of the conduct
of the enterprise," and the object cannot be "a preconceived plan having no business or
corporate purpose"). See BORIS I. BITrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX12.61[1] (7th ed. 2002).
ATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (as amended in 1989).
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(3).
59. Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-1 C.B. 696 app. A.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 38, at 311 n.194.
62. Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-1 C.B. 696, app. A, § 1.

63. Id.
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As a result, virtually all taxpayers asking for rulings try to satisfy an
approved purpose without regard to any additional purposes that might
exist. This forces taxpayers to do such things as the following:
1. offer more P or S stock than desired to employees after the spinoff
in order to meet the IRS requirements for showing that issuing a suffi64
cient amount of such stock was a valid business purpose for the spinoff;
2. find a key employee of a division of P that threatens to quit unless
granted options on stock that represents solely an interest in that
65
division;
3. obtain a letter from an investment banker stating that after the spinoff, P or S will be able to issue equity 66or borrow money more cheaply
than the combined business could have;
4. demonstrate an expected "significant cost savings" from the spinoff, generally a net savings over the three post-spinoff years equal to at
least 1% of net income over the three pre-spinoff years;67 or
5. when all else fails, demonstrate a fit and focus business purpose by
demonstrating "management, systemic, or other problems that arise (or
are exacerbated)" by the taxpayer's operation of different businesses
68
within a single group.
These requirements are, for the most part, divorced from reality. Issuing extra stock to employees after the spinoff may be the "price" of an
IRS ruling, but is rarely the primary business purpose for the spinoff.
Likewise, even if an executive of one division of P is unhappy about the
incentives provided by options on stock representing all of P, this would
not usually be a reason to quit and would seldom constitute the primary
reason for a spinoff. Moreover, few corporations would do a spinoff for
the minor cost savings that constitute a good business purpose under the
guidelines. In fact, corporations often do not even make such calculations until after the spinoff has been decided upon and the time has come
to obtain a ruling. Finally, even if the corporation's investment banker is
willing to write a letter stating that debt or equity financing will be
cheaper after the spinoff, the result is so uncertain that a corporation
would not usually plan a spinoff primarily for that purpose.
The result of the guidelines is that a corporation's ability to obtain an
IRS ruling may depend largely on the willingness of the corporation's
investment banker to write supporting letters to the IRS that attempt to
predict the unpredictable. These letters are heavily negotiated, and the
corporation will often have decided upon the spinoff long before the negotiation of the letter.
This entire effort makes no sense for a number of reasons. First, as a
practical matter, virtually every corporation wishing to do a spinoff can
64. Id. § 2.01(1)(b).
65. Id. § 2.O1(1)(a).
66. Id. §§ 2.02(2), 2.03(2).
67.

Id. § 2.04.

68. Id. § 2.05.
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eventually satisfy the IRS concerning its business purpose. However, vast
amounts of time and energy on the part of both the IRS and taxpayers
are devoted to this effort. In the final analysis, the time and energy are
completely nonproductive.
Second, in many cases everyone acknowledges that the primary reason
for the spinoff is different than the approved purpose. Nevertheless, this
guidelines as long as the approved
is entirely permissible under the ruling
69
purpose is a substantial purpose.
Third, a major reason for the effort is the rule that attempting to increase the combined stock price of P and S is a shareholder level purpose
and not a corporate business purpose. However, it is difficult to make
this distinction. Every benefit to a corporation should logically increase
the stock price and thus benefit its shareholders. Conversely, an increase
in stock price demonstrates that the shareholders value a corporation
more highly, and this increase in value is a corporate level benefit.
Finally, a purpose relating to the shareholder's personal situation
should not be a valid business purpose. The regulations properly use
"personal planning purposes of a shareholder" to illustrate this point.70
For example, if producing tax savings for a shareholder was a valid business purpose, Mrs. Gregory would have had a good business purpose for
her spinoff. The problem today is that the concept of shareholder level
business purpose has been extended beyond this situation without logical
justification.
Because the existing business purpose test is so illogical and nonproductive, it should be modified. One alternative would be to tighten
the business purpose rule and require a fundamental and objective corporate reason for a spinoff. A permissible purpose might be to avoid regulatory restrictions on a major acquisition, or to solve a clearly
demonstrated problem with competitors of P who do not want to deal
with S as long as it is related to P. This approach would not allow spinoffs
for relatively small projected cost savings, and would allow fit and focus
spinoffs only in the most extreme cases.
An alternative approach would be to loosen the business purpose rule
and adopt the same rule that presently exists for reorganizations. To the
extent this new rule would allow spinoffs to be used for purposes inconsistent with the purpose of the spinoff rules, these problems would be
solved directly.
The former approach of tightening the business purpose test could only
be justified on the ground that in light of General Utilities repeal, good
tax policy requires a significant cutback in "plain vanilla" spinoffs. However, there is no indication that Congress intended this result, and furthermore, this result would be inconsistent with the idea that spinoffs
remain as a form of reorganization. As a result, the latter approach of
69. Id. § 1.
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1989).
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loosening the business purpose requirement is far preferable. It would
eliminate the complexity that exists today with no real disadvantages.
As a result, the business purpose test for a spinoff should generally be
the same test as for a reorganization under § 368. 71 A purely personal
business purpose of the shareholder, such as saving taxes, should not be
sufficient for a spinoff just as it would not be for a reorganization. However, enhancing shareholder value should expressly be valid.
Moreover, in the case of a widely held public corporation, subject to
the exception below, the business purpose test should be applied so that it
would rarely be an impediment to a spinoff. The board of directors has a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders to act in the best interests of the shareholders, and the board should be presumed to be doing so in adopting a
spinoff. Just as a reorganization involving public companies would rarely
if ever be challenged on business purpose grounds, the same should be
true of a spinoff.
However, one exception to the liberalized business purpose test is appropriate. Consider the situation where P satisfies this business purpose
test, but the primary purpose of the distribution is to facilitate taxable
sales of P or S stock by shareholders of P. Such a purpose is inconsistent
with the concept that, after General Utilities repeal, a spinoff should represent a division of an existing business among its existing shareholders.
The continuity of interest rule as well as § 355(e) limit the ability of
shareholders to sell P or S stock after a spinoff as part of the spinoff plan.
However, neither rule would prevent a spinoff that has the purpose of
facilitating a post-spinoff cash sale of less than 50% of the P or S stock.
The device test, discussed further below, 72 is also inadequate in this

situation. The test is a vague balancing test, and has been interpreted to
allow a distribution to qualify under § 355 even though the only purpose
of the distribution was to facilitate a sale. 73 Moreover, the test is focused

on shareholder-level issues rather than General Utilities repeal. For example, it does not generally apply to non-pro rata splitoffs, and a public P
is a nondevice factor.
The simplest and most appropriate method of dealing with this issue
would be an exception to the liberalized business purpose test. Under
this approach, even if a distribution otherwise satisfies the business purpose test, it would automatically fail the test if the principal purpose of
the distribution (or possibly "a" principal purpose of the distribution) was
to facilitate taxable post-distribution sales of P or S stock by shareholders
of P.

71. For a similar conclusion, see Schultz, supra note 38, at 311 n.194.
72. See infra Part IV.B.1.
73. See Pulliam v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3052 (1997), nonacq., 1998-2 C.B. 664.
See infra note 87.
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B.

DEVICE TEST

1. Background
The device test has been in the statute since spinoffs were reinstated in
1951. The regulations state that a spinoff "presents a potential for tax
avoidance by facilitating the avoidance of the dividend provisions of the
Code through the subsequent sale or exchange of stock of one corporation and the retention of stock of another corporation. '7 4 The idea is that
if the shareholders of P were to receive S stock in a spinoff and then sell
their S (or P) stock for cash, they end up with P (or S) stock and cash.
This is the same result as if P had sold the S (or P) assets and paid a cash
dividend to the shareholders.75 This would no doubt be a device today, and
the cases generally so hold.
The device test is a facts and circumstances test.76 Factors indicating a

device are (1) a pro rata distribution of S stock, 77 (2) a sale of P or S stock
after the distribution, 78 (3) assets of P or S not used in a 5-year trade or
business,7 9 or (4) a business of P or S (a so-called "secondary business")
whose principal function is to serve the other business and which could be
sold without adverse effect on the other business.80 Regarding the sale of
stock factor, the greater the amount of P or S stock sold by the shareholders, and the greater the level of negotiations for the sale before the spinoff, the more likely a device exists. A sale after the spinoff is evidence
of a device even if the sale is not negotiated or agreed upon before the
distribution.8 1
The factors evidencing lack of a device are a (1) corporate business
purpose that outweighs any device factors,8 2 (2) the fact that P stock is
publicly traded and P has no greater-than-5% shareholder,8 3 and (3) the
fact that P shareholders are corporations that would be entitled to the
4
dividends received deduction.
A device is generally not considered to exist if P and S have no current
or accumulated earnings and profits and the distribution would not create
current earnings. 85 Nor is a device considered to exist in a splitoff where
each shareholder would be entitled to capital gain treatment under § 302
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1989).
75. See, e.g., S. Tulsa Pathology Lab., Inc. v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 84 (2002) (device test
applies where private P distributes S stock pro rata, and S shareholders sell all the S stock
on the same day in a prearranged plan). But see Pulliam, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3052 (1997),
discussed infra note 87.
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(1).
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(ii).
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iii).
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv)(B).
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv)(C).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iii).
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(3)(ii).
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(3)(iii).
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(3)(iv).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(5)(ii).
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if the distribution was taxable. 86
2. Reasons for Retaining the Test
The device test is vague, and the court decisions interpreting it are
sometimes difficult to defend based on the policies behind the test. 87 As
a result, it could be argued that the test should be eliminated and replaced with more precise prohibitions. Nevertheless, the test should be
retained for the following reasons:
a. The device test has been in the statute since the readoption of the
spinoff rules in 1951. In fact, to the extent that splitups remained permissible between 1934 and 1951, Gregory v. Helvering imposed a device test
during that period.
b. The device test serves a valuable function today in every pro rata
spinoff. It strongly discourages (1) planned sales of stock after the distribution, (2) large amounts of nonbusiness assets in P or S, or (3) a weak
business purpose for the distribution in comparison to other factors.
These restrictions are appropriate and prevent transactions that are similar to dividends.
c. If the device test were eliminated, other more specific rules would
be required to prevent dividend-like transactions. Such rules would increase the complexity of § 355 for all taxpayers, not only those who were
close to the line. In that sense, the device test plays a role similar to an
anti-abuse rule. Such a rule is a backstop that allows for simpler statutory
requirements, without the need for the statute to foresee and prevent
every possible specific method of abuse.
d. The need for the device test becomes even greater if the business
purpose test is liberalized, as is suggested above. 88 Consider a corporation owned by a single individual where there is a minimal business purpose for a spinoff, but where in reality the principal purpose for the
spinoff is truly personal to the shareholder (such as estate planning). The
spinoff would likely be disallowed today under the device test, i.e., the
pro rata distribution and the earnings in P would be device factors that
would outweigh the weak corporate level business purpose. This is the
correct result, because, if the primary purpose of the spinoff is purely
personal to the shareholder, there is no policy reason for allowing § 355
to apply. In order to ensure this result, either the proposed business purpose rule could be modified to require a balancing of personal and corporate business purposes, or the device test could be retained for this
purpose. The latter makes more sense.
e. It was recently argued that the active business requirement should
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(5)(iv).
87. See, e.g., Pulliam, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3052 (1997), nonacq., 1998-2 C.B. 664 (P distributes S to P's sole shareholder for the sole purpose of facilitating the sale of 49% of S to
a key employee of S; held, the distribution was necessary for the sale to occur, and the
business purpose for the sale overcame the device factor created by the planned sale).
88. See supra Part IV.A.
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completely replace the device test.8 9 Under this theory, if all the assets of
P and S consist of 5-year active business assets, it should not matter that a
significant number of shareholders plan to sell their P or S stock after the
distribution. The reasoning is that a shareholder selling P or S stock is
giving up an interest in real business assets, and a bailout only arises
when the shareholder receives cash without a reduction in interest in operating assets. As a result, the argument runs, capital gain treatment is
appropriate in this case. Likewise, there is no abuse, because if P had
sold the assets and distributed the proceeds, the noncorporate shareholders would probably be entitled to capital gain treatment under the partial
liquidation rules of § 302(b)(4).
However, this reasoning does not seem correct. The shareholder receives cash and a continuing interest in a smaller P, just as if P had sold
the S business and distributed the cash as a dividend. Moreover, the reliance on § 302(b)(4) is questionable because that section presupposes that
P paid tax on the sale of the business before distributing the sale proceeds
in partial liquidation. The combination of § 355 to achieve tax-free treatment at the corporate level, along with the analogy to § 302(b)(4) to
achieve capital gain treatment at the shareholder level, is too good to be
true.
3. Problems with the Test
The foregoing reasons support the retention of the device test. However, this is not to say that the test should be left unchanged. In several
respects, some of the device factors have tended to take on a life of their
own, without regard to the logic of their application in any particular
case. Moreover, in certain situations the device test is too narrow. These
issues are discussed in the following sections.
a. The logic behind the device factor of a secondary business is unclear. A secondary business that can be sold seems to be no different
than any other business held by P or S that can be sold. This factor
should be eliminated.
b. More significantly, where P is a public corporation, the IRS ruling
guidelines apply the device factor of stock sales by requiring P to represent that no 5% shareholder has a plan or intention to sell any stock in
P or S after the distribution. 90 This rule makes sense when the 5% shareholder is part of the management of P and thus plays a role in planning
the spinoff. It makes no sense, however, in the case of a passive investor
such as a mutual fund. The management of P will have no idea whether a
fund will even continue to hold its P stock until the time of the spinoff, let
alone whether it will sell its P or S stock after the spinoff. The spinoff
should not be tested as a device based on the undisclosed intent of such a
fund.
89. Schultz, supra note 38, at 311 n.194.
90. Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-1 C.B. 696, § 4.05(1)(a).
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Moreover, because P cannot give the representation required by the
IRS without obtaining a representation from the fund, the result is to put
the fund in the position of having veto power over a spinoff. The fund
will have no desire to be in this position. However, it will be justifiably
concerned that a representation as required by the IRS could limit its
future flexibility.
There is no logic to the validity of a spinoff depending on the intent of
an independent shareholder such as a mutual fund. As a result, when P is
publicly traded, the device factor relating to stock sales after the distribution should not apply to sales by nonmanagement shareholders of P who
own less than 10% of P, unless a principal purpose of the distribution was
to facilitate such sales. In practice, this will exclude sales by mutual funds
in most instances.
c. Under the regulations, if P has a 5-year active trade or business, P's
purchase of another trade or business in the same line of business is
treated as an expansion of the original business, and the entire combined
business is treated as meeting the 5-year test. 9 1 This rule is known as the
"business expansion doctrine."
As noted above, one device factor is the existence of assets that do not
meet the 5-year trade or business test. 92 Thus, this device factor does not
apply to assets that satisfy the business expansion doctrine even though
they were acquired within the 5-year period. Moreover, this device factor
does not apply to business expansion assets no matter how closely related
the purchase of the assets is to the distribution. For example, P might use
excess cash the day before the distribution to purchase assets in contemplation of the distribution.
In addition, there is no limit on the amount of assets that can be purchased under the business expansion doctrine. P cannot use excess cash
during the 5-year period to acquire any non-expansion assets without
having to overcome the device factor. It is illogical that the business expansion doctrine should be a complete exemption from the device factor
93
regardless of the actual facts.
Today, the business purpose test would impose a practical limit on the
avoidance of the device test in this manner. However, if the business
purpose test is liberalized as suggested above, 94 it will provide few if any
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1989).
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv)(B) (as amended in 1989).
93. See also Robert Willens, Finessing the 'Active Business' Test of Section 355: IRS
Concession Allows Taxpayers to Avoid the Five-Year Rule, Daily Tax Report (BNA) No.
165, at J-1 (Aug. 26, 2002) (the business expansion doctrine is an "extraordinary concession" by the IRS, id. at J-2, and the doctrine "at the end of the day, allows the use of the
Section 355 rules to avoid the tax on dividends." Id. at J-3.). Cf. Robert Willens, Spinoffs
of Recently Purchased Businesses-What will be the Impact of a Recent Tax Court Decision,
84 J. TAX'N 32, 35 (1996) (the doctrine "represents a reasonable and measured response
... on the grounds that a taxpayer that has acquired activities in a line of business similar
or identical to the business it has historically conducted is invariably motivated by corporate objectives, rather than by a purpose to achieve a bailout of E&P").
94. See supra Part IV.A.
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limits on these transactions. In fact, P's ability to avoid the device test
through the business expansion doctrine would be even more significant
if the business expansion doctrine were tested on a group basis rather
than on an individual company basis, as is suggested below. 95 Under this
scenario, if P was engaged in business B, P could use its excess cash to
buy the stock of a corporation engaged in business B, rather than directly
buying the business B assets. The result would be the use of the cash to
avoid the device test combined with the lack of corporate-level tax on an
asset sale.
Consequently, when applying the device factor relating to assets that
are not 5-year business assets, the business expansion doctrine should be
disregarded. Under this rule, all assets purchased within the 5-year period would count as a negative factor, even if P is already in the same
business. Of course, P would still be permitted to overcome the negative
factor, e.g., in the case of a routine incremental expansion of an existing
business, just as P is permitted to overcome the negative factor today
when the business expansion doctrine does not apply.
d. The device test was adopted long before General Utilities repeal. As
a result, the statute by its terms is limited to protecting the fisc against the
avoidance of shareholder dividend taxes. Moreover, this is why the regulations have a specific exclusion for a non-pro rata splitoff, and why a
public corporation without 5% shareholders is evidence of nondevice.
Thus, the statute by its terms does not prevent the use of § 355 to avoid
General Utilities repeal. Likewise, the specific exclusions and factors in
the regulations make it difficult if not impossible for the IRS to use the
device test to enforce General Utilities repeal in the splitoff or public corporation context.
To be sure, Congress has enacted some specific provisions, such as
§ 355(d) and (e), to deal with the use of § 355 to avoid General Utilities
repeal. However, in the absence of specific limiting provisions, there is
little today to prevent such use. In fact, if the business purpose test is
liberalized as suggested above, 96 taxpayers will have even greater ability
to engage in spinoff transactions that are inconsistent with General Utilities repeal.
Some specific types of transactions that seem inconsistent with General
Utilities repeal are discussed separately above 97 and below. 98 However, it
is likely that creative tax lawyers will think of other transactions that violate the principles of General Utilities repeal but are not covered by any
of the specific prohibitions of § 355.
One method of avoiding this problem would be to expand the device
test to apply to distributions having the effect of avoiding the purposes of
General Utilities repeal. Moreover, for this new prong of the test, the fact
95.
96.
97.
98.

See
See
See
See

infra Part IV.D.4.
supra Part IV.A.
supra Part IV.A (final 4 paragraphs).
infra Part IV.E.
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that a distribution is non-pro rata and/or the fact that P is publicly traded
would not be relevant.
This new prong of the device test would be a backstop to specific provisions of § 355 designed to enforce General Utilities repeal. In that regard,
it would serve a role comparable to the existing device test, which is a
backstop to specific provisions of § 355 designed to prevent the avoidance
of dividend treatment to shareholders. Moreover, this expansion of the
device test would promote simplification of the statute. Absent this provision, a series of additional detailed rules would be required in lieu of
the more general device test. This is not in the interest of either taxpayers or the government.
However, there are a number of significant problems with this expansion of the device test. First, if a distribution fails the device test, § 355
does not apply, and the distribution is taxable at both the corporate and
shareholder level. In contrast, as a policy matter, Congress has indicated
by the enactment of § 355(d) and (e) that a distribution in violation of the
principles of General Utilities repeal should be taxable only at the corporate level. Moreover, as a practical matter, if violation of the new device
test resulted in tax at both the corporate and shareholder levels, the IRS
could claim that an ordinary violation of § 355(d) or (e) also violated the
device test and thus resulted in shareholder-level tax.
These problems could be solved by a separate device test solely for all
General Utilities violations, with the penalty limited to corporate level
tax. However, this would be extremely complex, and would inevitably
lead to litigation over whether a transaction violated the existing as well
as the new device tests.
Second, if the device test was expanded to cover all General Utilities
problems, difficult issues would arise as to how the new test would interact with existing § 355(d) and (e). For example, if a transaction was generally within the scope of those provisions but avoided the specific
application of those provisions, questions would arise as to when and
under what circumstances the new device test would apply.
Third, the new device test would necessarily be very open-ended, as is'
the existing test. However, the existing test has been in the law for many
years and taxpayers generally have learned to live with it. The new test
would raise innumerable questions and would create uncertainties about
numerous types of transactions. As a practical matter, in many cases
where a taxpayer today can rely on an opinion of counsel for a spinoff, an
advance ruling from the IRS would be necessary. The IRS would no
doubt also have great difficulty in determining the intended scope of the
new test.
As a result, the device test should not presently be expanded to cover
all transactions that are inconsistent with the purposes of General Utilities
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repeal. Rather, Congress and the Treasury Department99 should continue the practice of adopting specific statutory or regulatory provisions
to deal with specific situations as they arise. 10 0 Further, if these more
specific actions turn out to be inadequate, an expansion of the device test
could be reconsidered.
C.

CONTROL TEST

The control test is primarily relevant under § 355 because P is required
to distribute control of S. As noted above, 10 1 control is defined as 80% of
the voting stock and 80% of each class of nonvoting stock.
This definition of control allows P to control S (and spin off S) even
though P might own a relatively small percentage of the common equity
of S. For example, suppose P owns all eight shares of a class of common
stock of S having ten votes per share, and the public has for many years
owned twenty shares of a class of common stock of S having one vote per
share. P controls S and can spin off S even though it has only about 28%
of the economic ownership of S. Similarly, if P begins with 100% ownership of S, S can issue a large amount of low-vote stock for cash to the
public. As long as P keeps 80% of the voting power (to maintain control)
and more than 50% of the total equity (to avoid § 355(e)), P can immediately spin off S even though its economic interest in S may have been
diluted to well below 80%.
Alternatively, suppose P owns all the voting common stock of S, but S
has a very small class of nonvoting common or preferred stock held by
third parties. P has most of the economic ownership in S. However, P
does not control S (and thus cannot spin off S) because it does not have
80% of the nonvoting stock.
If § 355 is intended to allow a single corporation (or equivalent corporate group) to break apart, these examples illustrate that the existing control test is both too broad and too narrow. On the one hand, P's voting
control of S should be necessary but not sufficient for a spinoff, and P
should also be required to own most of the economic interests in S. On
the other hand, a spinoff should be allowed even if S has a small amount
of nonvoting stock none of which is owned by P.
Thus, a more appropriate test for control under § 355 would be the
consolidated return test under § 1504(a)(2). This test requires ownership
of 80% of the total vote and 80% of the total value of all outstanding
stock. The exceptions to consolidation based on the status of a subsidiary
corporation, 0 2 such as a foreign corporation, should not be applicable
under this test.
99. The Treasury Department has broad authority to issue regulations to enforce General Utilities repeal. I.R.C. § 337(d) (2002).
100. See infra Part IV.E.4 for an example of a specific rule designed to deal with a
specific General Utilities issue.

101. See supra Part I.
102. I.R.C. § 1504(b) (2002).
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For consolidated return purposes, § 1504(a)(4) disregards straight nonvoting preferred stock. As a result, P can consolidate with S if P owns all
the common stock of S, even if S has a very large amount of nonvoting
preferred stock held by third parties. Consider whether this exception
should apply for purposes of the spinoff rules. From the point of view of
the holder of common stock, preferred stock is similar to debt. Therefore, the outstanding preferred stock should not detract from P's control
of S. Moreover, outstanding preferred stock does not prevent the filing
of consolidated returns, and if two corporations are sufficiently united to
file a consolidated return, logically they are sufficiently united for P to
spin off S. Finally, there is an advantage to avoiding a proliferation of
different tests for control.
On the other hand, a holder of S preferred stock is in fact an equity
holder of S and takes equity risks in S. Thus, it can be argued that if a
large amount of S preferred stock is held by third parties, a spinoff of S
differs from the division of a single corporation. Moreover, if preferred
stock does not count, P could extract virtually unlimited amounts of cash
from S prior to a spinoff by having S issue preferred stock and then moving the cash proceeds to P prior to the spinoff.
On balance, the § 1504(a)(4) rule disregarding preferred stock should
apply, and any concern about the extraction of cash from S should be
dealt with separately. As a result, the control test should be the same as
the stock ownership test for consolidation.
A similar proposal was made by the Treasury Department in the past
for reorganizations and § 351, as well as spinoffs. 10 3 However, it received
mixed reviews from bar associations,1 0 4 in part because of the reduced
flexibility it would provide to taxpayers under § 355. No action has been
taken by Congress.
The control test applies under § 355 not only in determining whether P
controls S, but for a variety of other purposes, such as in applying the
trade or business tests to S and its controlled subsidiaries. The § 1504 test
is appropriate for these other purposes also.

103. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2001 BUDGET PROPOSAL, at 363-66
(Comm. Print 2000) [hereinafter 2001 Budget Proposal]; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N,
106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S
FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL, at 220-22 (1999) [hereinafter 2000 Budget
Proposal].
104. Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Tax'n, Comments on Proposed Change to Section 368(c)
Definition of CorporateControl, 83 TAX NOTES 1357, 1360, 1364 (1999); Letter from Harold Handler, Chair, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Tax Section, to the Honorable Jonathan Talisman, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Tax Policy, Dep't of the Treasury (July 8, 1999), reprinted in
1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 135-28 (1999) (supporting the proposal but noting that a significant minority disagreed).
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D.

ACTIVE TRADE OR BUSINESS TEST

1. Background
Section 355(b) requires that immediately after a distribution, both P
and S be engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business. A business
qualifies only if it has been conducted for 5 years and was not acquired in
a taxable transaction during that period. A business that meets this test is
referred to as a qualifying business. P or S can meet the trade or business
test either by directly conducting a qualifying business, or by having substantially all of its assets consist of stock in controlled subsidiaries (not
acquired in taxable transactions within 5 years) that conduct qualifying
businesses. A subsidiary that meets this test is referred to as a qualifying
subsidiary.
Two IRS ruling guidelines are important for purposes of these tests.
First, for a corporation to meet the trade or business test by engaging in
its own business, the value of the gross assets of the business must generally represent at least 5% of the total gross assets of the corporation (referred to as the 5% test). 10 5 Second, for a corporation to meet the test on
the ground that substantially all its assets consist of stock in qualifying
subsidiaries, such stock must represent at least 90% of the net assets and
70% of the gross assets of the corporation (referred to as the 90%/70%
06
test).1
The trade or business test was first enacted in 1951 without the 5-year
rule. Its purpose was apparently to be an anti-abuse rule to be applied in
conjunction with the device test. 10 7 The 5-year rule was adopted in 1954.
Under this rule, for example, a subsidiary of P is not a qualifying subsidiary if it was purchased within the preceding 5 years. The purpose of this
rule "is to prevent a distributing corporation from accumulating excess
funds to purchase the stock of a corporation having an active business
and immediately distributing such stock to its stockholders." 10 8
Note that the active business test is directly related to the device test in
that the device factors include the existence of assets not used in a 5-year
business. Thus, the use of funds within the 5-year period to acquire a
business directly or indirectly, and the distribution of the business so purchased, is considered to be similar to a dividend paid by P to its
shareholders.
The trade or business rules raise difficult practical and policy issues.
These are discussed next.
105. Rev. Proc. 2002-3, 2002-1 I.R.B. 117, § 4.01(31). The IRS "may rule" in other
cases where the taxpayer can establish that the trade or business is not de minimis compared with the other assets or activities of the corporation and its subsidiaries.
106. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
107. S. REP. No. 82-781, at 58 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 458, 499.
108. Rev. Rul. 74-5, 1974-1 C.B. 82.
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Applying the Test to a Corporate Group

A major problem with the trade or business test is that P and S must
meet the test on an individual corporate basis, not a group basis. This
leads to enormous complexities. Moreover, there is no logical reason for
the test to be applied separately to P and S if spinoffs are viewed as a
means to allow the division of a corporate group.
For example, assume S will directly engage in a qualifying business after the spinoff. However, suppose that after the spinoff P's only assets
will be the stock of two subsidiaries, S1 (a qualifying subsidiary) and S2
(purchased within 5 years and thus not a qualifying subsidiary). Assume
S1 and S2 are of equal size. P fails the trade or business test, because it
does not engage in a business directly, and after the distribution only half
of its assets consist of stock in qualifying subsidiaries. Likewise, P would
fail the trade or business test if, immediately before the spinoff, it contributed the stock of S1 to S2. The reason is that S2 directly engages in a
nonqualifying business, and so substantially all of the S2 assets do not
consist of either qualifying assets or stock of a qualifying subsidiary. Thus
S2 is a nonqualifying subsidiary of P.
On the other hand, P would satisfy the trade or business test if, immediately before the spinoff, (1) it liquidated S1 into P so that P would be
directly engaged in a qualifying business; (2) it contributed the stock of S2
to S1, or merged S2 into S1, so that substantially all of P's assets consisted
of stock in a corporation (Si) which is engaged in a qualifying business
and which had not been purchased within 5 years; or (3) it merged S1 into
S2, so that substantially all of P's assets consisted of stock in a corporation (S2) engaged in a qualifying business which business was contributed
to the corporation after the purchase of the corporation. 10 9
There is no good policy reason why P should satisfy the trade or business test in some of these situations but not the others. The policy justification for a spinoff has nothing to do with where in a particular corporate
group the qualifying or nonqualifying assets are located. Good business
reasons typically exist for the particular corporate structure of a group,
and it is completely arbitrary that the particular structure should affect
the qualification of a spinoff.
Consider, for example, a typical case where P is a holding company and
does not directly own any significant trade or business. P might have first
tier subsidiaries that were purchased within the preceding 5 years. Alternatively, P might have some nonbusiness assets. Even though P has substantial qualifying subsidiaries, these nonqualifying subsidiaries and/or
nonbusiness assets could easily cause P to fail the 90%/70% test.
The only choices for P in this situation are (1) to transfer the stock of
the nonqualifying subsidiaries, and any nonbusiness assets, to qualifying
109. Alternative (3) is permissible even though P had purchased the S2 stock within the

5 preceding years. Although a trade or business held by S2 at the time of the purchase is
disqualified, see I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(D) (2002) (initial parenthetical), a qualifying business

contributed to S2 after the purchase remains qualified.
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subsidiaries, or (2) to engage in its own qualifying business. The latter
alternative may be difficult because of the 5% test. P's gross assets would
include the value of all of its subsidiaries, meaning that it would have to
engage in a significant business in order to meet the test.
The restructuring of a group that is necessary to meet the trade or business requirements for P can take an enormous amount of time and effort.
Moreover, from P's point of view, the restructuring makes no business
sense and is done solely to satisfy the statutory requirement. From the
IRS's point of view, it may spend much time and effort in determining
whether P, on a stand-alone basis, is engaged in a sufficiently large trade
or business. None of this activity is useful in any way, and there is no
policy of § 355 that is being carried out.
As a result, the trade or business test should be applied on a groupwide basis. That is, P and its direct and indirect controlled subsidiaries
after the spinoff would be treated as a single corporation, and S and its
controlled subsidiaries would be treated as a single corporation. This
proposal was advanced in bills introduced by Senator Breaux'1 0 and has
passed both houses of Congress in legislation that was later vetoed by the
12
President.1 1' It has also been supported by the Treasury Department,
the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 113 and at least one bar
11 4
association.
An additional issue is whether a U.S. group should be able to look
through to a foreign subsidiary to establish its qualifying trade or business. For example, suppose that after a distribution P's only assets are a
nonqualifying domestic subsidiary and a qualifying foreign subsidiary.
Should P be considered to meet the trade or business test? If the answer
is yes, then the proposal would allow spinoffs that could not readily be
accomplished today even through restructuring.
This result is reasonable. If P's only post-spinoff asset is stock in a
qualifying foreign subsidiary, the spinoff would be allowed even today,
because § 355 currently makes no distinction between domestic and foreign subsidiaries. It follows that disqualified domestic assets of P should
not prevent a spinoff even if the P group's qualifying business is held by a
foreign subsidiary. As a result, P and all its controlled subsidiaries, including foreign subsidiaries, should be treated as a single corporation for

110.
111.
112.
103, at
113.

S. 2538, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1158, 107th Cong. (2001).
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-289, at 483-85 (1999).
2001 Budget Proposal, supra note 103, at 221-23; 2000 Budget Proposal, supra note
144-45.

STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT
TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 251 (Comm. Print

2001).
114. See Letter from Steven C. Todrys, Chair, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Tax Section, to the
Honorable John Breaux, U.S. Senator from Louisiana (Jan. 12, 1999), reprinted in 1999
TAX NOTES TODAY 10-41 (1999).
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this purpose.' 1 5
Note that the proposal to apply the trade or business test on a group
basis is most supportable if the proposed new control test' 16 is also
adopted. The existing control test permits P to control a subsidiary even
though P owns a relatively small economic interest in it. In that situation,
it is much less clear that the subsidiary should be combined with P under
the group trade or business test in determining whether P should be permitted to spin off S.
3.

Permitted Nonbusiness Assets

The trade or business test under § 355 requires only that P and S be
engaged in the active conduct of a qualifying business immediately after
the spinoff. There is no statutory limit on the amount of nonbusiness
assets that P or S can hold. The only practical minimums are the device
test and the 5% test. However, the 5% test is only an IRS ruling guideline that by its terms is subject to exceptions. Moreover, a taxpayer not
desiring an IRS ruling can rely on the literal language of the statute and
take the position that any business (no matter how small in absolute
terms or as a percentage of the total assets) is sufficient.
Moreover, a spinoff at a time when P or S holds a large amount of
nonbusiness assets is very similar to a cash dividend to the shareholders.
If the nonbusiness assets are appreciated securities, the result of the spinoff is the avoidance of both capital gains tax at the P level as well as (in
the case of a pro rata spinoff) dividend tax at the shareholder level.
The device test is not adequate to police these transactions. The test is
very vague, does not apply to splitoffs, and does not generally apply to
public corporations because of the nondevice factor. Moreover, there is
no policy reason that such a low proportion of business assets should be
permissible as a statutory matter, even aside from the device test.
At present, the 5% test ameliorates the unfairness of applying the
trade or business test on an entity-by-entity basis. In fact, the 5% test is
heavily relied upon by large public corporations which fit squarely within
the purposes of § 355 but which have difficulty meeting the trade or business test on a separate entity basis. If, however, the trade or business test
were modified to apply on a groupwide basis, as proposed above, 11 7 there
would be little remaining justification for permitting a low threshold of
business assets.
Thus, the required percentage of qualifying assets should substantially
exceed 5%. The percentage, however, should not be too high. Just as
today, "bad" assets for this purpose would include any business assets
acquired by P in taxable transactions within the preceding 5 years (unless
115. S. 2538, 105th Cong. (1998) and S. 1158, 107th Cong. (2001) excluded foreign corporations for this purpose. However, the sources cited supra notes 1.11-14 included or
supported the inclusion of foreign corporations.
116. See supra Part IV.C.
117. See supra Part IV.D.2.

2003]

SPINOFFRULES

the business expansion doctrine applies), as well as stock in any less-than80% owned subsidiaries.
One reasonable possibility would be to have the required percentage
for qualifying assets set at 50%. (The percentage is assumed to be 50%
for purposes of the discussion below.) Nonabusive cases, however, might
well arise where the actual percentage of qualified assets is less than 50%.
Thus, a waiver of the percentage should be available based on an advance
ruling from the IRS to the taxpayer indicating that the distribution would
not violate the purposes of the active trade or business test. The ruling
would take into account the device test as well as General Utilities repeal
since the trade or business test would be a backstop for both. 11 8
4.

The Business Expansion Doctrine

As discussed above, 1 9 under the business expansion doctrine, if P has
an active 5-year business and purchases another trade or business in the
same line of business, the entire combined business is treated as meeting
the 5-year test.12 0 The purchased portion of the business can then be
21
spun off at any time.1
The business expansion doctrine applies at present on a corporation by
corporation basis, as do all the active business tests. For example, if P has
a qualifying business, a purchase by S of assets in the same business will
result in the acquisition of a nonqualifying business as to S, although a
purchase of the same assets by P would be considered a business expansion as to P.
Moreover, the IRS reportedly treats an acquisition by P as a business
expansion of a P business only if the acquired assets actually "touch"
p.122 In other words, if P is in business X, a direct acquisition of additional X assets by P would qualify, but a purchase by P of stock of a
corporation holding those assets would not qualify. Thus, P could buy
some additional X assets, immediately drop them into new S, and then
spin off S. However, if P bought the stock of S with S holding those
assets P could not immediately spin off S.
The scope of the "touching" rule is not clear. For example, suppose
that in the above example, P were to buy the stock of S and then liquidate S into P. At that point, the new X assets would be in P. It is not
clear whether this would be sufficient touching so that the new assets
would count as 5-year assets for purposes of a spinoff shortly thereafter.
Note that the touching rule is analogous to the existing application of
the trade or business test on a corporation by corporation basis. The
118. See infra Part I.E. (discussing the connection between the trade or business test

and General Utilities repeal).
119. See supra Part IV.B.3.c.
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1989).
121. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(c) ex. 8.
122. See, e.g., MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND
Buyou-rs $ 1004.2.1.3 (2002) (expressing uncertainty about the IRS position in a number
of situations not involving "touching").
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touching rule, however, makes no more sense than such application of the
trade or business test. 123 Thus, if the trade or business test is changed to
apply on a group basis, the business expansion doctrine should likewise
apply on a group basis. The result would be that a stock acquisition could
be a permissible business expansion.
E.

ACTIVE BUSINESSES HELD FOR LESS THAN FIVE YEARS

1. Background
In two situations, assets held by the P group are treated as qualifying
assets even though they have been held by the group for less than 5 years
at the time of the distribution. The assets in question are those acquired
either under the business expansion doctrine or in a tax-free manner. P
can avoid the purposes of General Utilities repeal, as well as the purposes
of the proposed 50% active trade or business test, by acquiring these assets and (1) spinning them off, or (2) using them as qualifying assets that
permit the spinoff of other assets.
This problem is not solved by the device test, either as it exists today or
as expanded to cover business expansion assets. 124 The reason is that the
device test does not deal with General Utilities issues, does not apply to
assets acquired in a tax free manner, does not apply to splitoffs, and generally does not apply to public corporations because of the nondevice
factor. Moreover, although the existing business purpose test restricts
these transactions, the proposed liberalized test would be far less restrictive. The following discussion of the two situations assumes adoption of
the proposed business purpose test.
2. Business Expansion Doctrine
Under the business expansion doctrine, if P has a qualifying business, P
can buy any amount of assets used in the same business from third parties
for the purpose of spinning off those purchased assets (or for the purpose
of spinning off the existing P assets). The purchase price can come from
either existing or borrowed funds. The size of the existing business as
compared to the newly purchased business is irrelevant, as is the lack of
any operational relationship between the businesses.
Likewise, if P is a 20% managing partner in a partnership that has an
active business, and the 5-year tests are met, P is considered to be engaged in a qualifying business. P can purchase the remaining 80% ownership interest in the partnership for cash, allowing the entire business to be
considered a 5-year business of P, and (assuming P has a separate qualifying business) P can then immediately spin off that entire business. 12 5
In fact, under current law, P could apparently buy a group of assets,
5% of which happen to overlap with any one of P's qualifying businesses,
123. Id.
124. See supra Part IV.B.3.c.
125. Rev. Rul. 2002-49, 2002-32 I.R.B. 288.
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and then immediately drop down all of the acquired assets to new S and
spin off S. S would then be considered to have a qualifying business that
met the 5% test. If the business expansion doctrine were modified to
apply on a group basis, as long as an unrelated S owned the requisite
percentage of qualifying assets, P might be able to buy the stock of S and
126
shortly thereafter spin off all or part of the S assets.
3.

Tax-Free Acquisitions

Similar issues arise when P acquires a business in a tax-free manner
within the 5 years preceding the distribution. The business is a qualifying
business, assuming it has been conducted for a total of 5 years including
the pre-acquisition period. A permissible acquisition under this rule
would necessarily be made by P entirely for P stock. As a result, there is
no device issue because cash of P is not being used to acquire an asset.
An acquisition of this type, however, raises significant issues in light of
General Utilities repeal. For example, suppose P owns 60% of S's only
outstanding class of common stock. Today, S can recapitalize its stock
into high-vote stock held by P and low-vote stock held by the minority
shareholders, with P ending up with at least 80% of the vote of S. P has
acquired control of S in a tax-free manner and can spin off S the next day
(or else P can spin off other assets and use the S business as its own active
business). This result is improper if the purpose of the spinoff rules is to
allow the division of a preexisting corporate group.
This transaction would not work if the definition of control proposed
above 127 were adopted. Nevertheless, even under the proposed definition, other tax-free spinoffs would still be permitted that are inconsistent
with General Utilities repeal. Consider the following examples, which assume that P and S each has a qualifying business and that there is no 50%
change of ownership of P or S under § 355(e).
(a) P owns 60% of S. P acquires the remaining 40% of S for P
stock in a "B" reorganization. P could not immediately spin off S
under the reorganization rules. P, however, achieves a similar result
by spinning off all of its other assets the next day, leaving S as its sole
qualifying subsidiary.
(b) P owns 60% of S. P contributes sufficient cash or assets to S
in exchange for S stock so as to bring P's ownership in S to 80%. P
then immediately spins off S (or all of P's non-S assets) in a divisive
D reorganization.
(c) P owns 100% of S. P acquires all the stock of T in a "B" reorganization. P immediately spins off S and keeps T as a qualifying
subsidiary. P may or may not have other assets. It is not clear that
this transaction is taxable to P under § 355(e), despite the more than
126. See infra Part IV.E.3 (discussing the possible application of I.R.C. § 355(e) to this
situation).
127. See supra Part IV.C.
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50% change in ownership of T. 128
4.

Conclusions

In both of these situations involving acquisitions of assets within the 5year period, the spinoff is achieving far more than the division of a preexisting corporate group. As a result, the transactions in question violate
the principles of General Utilities repeal. Moreover, because the assets
acquired in both situations are qualifying assets, the result is an end run
around the proposed 50% trade or business test. No matter how many
nonqualifying assets the P group held before a spinoff, P could always
acquire sufficient qualifying assets in either manner before the distribution to permit P and S to each satisfy the 50% test after the distribution.
There is no good solution to the problem raised by acquisitions of this
type. One possibility is to consider all assets that enter the group in any
manner within the 5-year period before the distribution as nonqualifying
assets under the proposed 50% test. This approach, however, has a number of problems. First, it is overbroad. In many cases, the assets in question might be acquired in the ordinary course of business and should be
good rather than bad assets under the 50% test. Moreover, the proposed
approach would mean that P's acquisition of assets could preclude a subsequent spinoff even though a spinoff before the asset acquisition would
be permissible. 2 9 This makes no sense.
Second, a reverse acquisition rule would be needed. For example, suppose the X corporate group is worth $100, the Y corporate group is worth
$400, and X acquires Y in exchange for 80% of the outstanding X stock.
Instead of X being treated as having 80% bad assets (the Y assets) under
the trade or business test, the combined group should be treated as the Y
group with 20% bad assets (the X assets).
Third, this approach does not deal with newly created groups. For example, if P spins off S, does the new S group not have any qualifying
assets for 5 years? Does it matter whether S was preexisting or was
formed in a divisive D reorganization? What if P owns all the S stock and
sells 30%, creating a new S group? These questions are difficult and
would raise additional complexities. As a result, treating all acquired assets as bad assets for purposes of the 50% test has many problems. Thus,
assets acquired by the P group in a tax-free manner or as business expansion assets should continue to count as good assets under the test.
128. I.R.C. § 355(e) (2002) requires a 50% change in ownership of P or S, but the 50%
change of ownership occurs in T. The theory for the application of § 355(e) is that T is a
predecessor of P under § 355(e)(4)(D). This, however, is by no means clear. See GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 122,
1010 ex. 2, at 10-102 (this fact pattern "does not ....
implicate" I.R.C. § 355(e)); Mark J. Silverman et al., 'Spin-Offs': The New Anti-Morris
Trust and Intragroup Spin Provisions, 78 TAX NOTES 329, 341 (1998).
129. For example, suppose P and S each held only qualifying assets of $100. P then
acquires additional assets of $200, not to be spun off, either as business expansion assets
(with borrowed funds) or on a tax-free basis. P would fail the 50% test after the spinoff of
S, even though P would satisfy the test if the spinoff had occurred before the acquisition.
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Another possible approach would be to interpret or expand § 355(e) to
cover most of these cases based on the change of ownership of the business acquired by P within the 5-year period. This approach, however,
could not cover business expansion assets purchased for cash, and any
attempt to cover most tax-free acquisitions within the 5-year period
would be vastly overbroad. Any mechanical rule would have similar
problems.
The only reasonable alternative appears to be the adoption of a facts
and circumstances test. Such a test would be similar to the device test,
but it would be far more narrowly focused. It would be applicable to all
§ 355 distributions, including splitoffs and distributions by public
corporations.
One possibility for such a test would be the following: P would be
taxed on a distribution if (a) during the 5-year period before a distribution, the P group acquired assets from outside the group that are qualifying assets under the proposed 50% trade or business test; (b) after the
distribution those assets represent more than a specified portion (e.g.,
20% or 25%) of the then-value of the assets of P or S; (c) P would be
taxable on the distribution under the usual rules if the assets in question
were not qualifying assets under the 50% test; and (d) based on all the
facts and circumstances, the tax-free treatment of P was inconsistent with
the purposes of General Utilities repeal or the 50% trade or business test.
The ultimate facts and circumstances determination would be based on
the connection between the acquisition and the distribution, as in the existing device test. Shareholders of P would not be affected by the test.
The test has technical problems. For example, it would allow P to acquire appreciated assets on a tax-free basis, and then spin off existing
unappreciated assets with no taxable gain. Moreover, if all the assets of
the P and S groups were qualifying assets, acquisitions by P before the
distribution could allow each group to almost double in size without triggering clause (c) of the test. However, this latter issue would also arise if
P acquired new nonqualifying assets for cash. Therefore, the problem lies
with the 50% trade or business test rather than this test.
More fundamentally, the adoption of a new test of this type is far from
ideal. Recent history with § 355(d) and (e) has demonstrated that a new
test leads to periods of great turmoil until the test is clarified. The test,
however, is not proposed in a vacuum, but rather in conjunction with a
series of other proposals. It is difficult to see how those other proposals,
particularly the liberalization of the business purpose test, can be implemented without either this type of test or a broader device test that applies to General Utilities repeal. Otherwise, almost any mixing and
matching of assets between unrelated parties before a spinoff would be
permissible. The likely result would be an explosion of these types of
transactions.
Moreover, the proposed test is far preferable to a more general device
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test for the reasons discussed above. 130 The proposed test will likely apply to relatively few corporations, certainly far fewer than will benefit
from the liberalization of the business purpose test. Thus, the net effect
should be a great simplification of spinoff practice, even though some
taxpayers will face additional complexity. In addition, the proposed test
is not likely to prevent many transactions that could be done today, since
most transactions it would prevent would probably fail the current business purpose test. As a result, the proposed test should be viewed as the
best option in a series of poor alternatives.
V.

TAXATION OF THE DISTRIBUTING CORPORATION
A.

SECrION 355(d)

As discussed above, 13 1 § 355(d) is aimed at situations where a buyer
(X) buys stock of P and, following a spinoff, X's cost basis in the P stock
is allocated directly to stock in a business representing only a portion of
the overall P business. The result is similar to a mirror liquidation. As a
result, § 355(d) is generally considered to be an appropriate response to
General Utilities repeal.
Section 355(d) contains some technical rules that would impose tax on
P in situations that clearly go beyond the purposes of the section. The
final regulations, 32 however, eliminated this overbreadth and are generally considered reasonable. 133 As a result, no change is needed in
§ 355(d).
B.
1.

SEcnON 355(e)

The Statute

Section 355(e) is controversial because it stops Morris Trust transactions that contain no element of the basis shifting that is the key to a
mirror liquidation. The legislative history of § 355(e) states that:
The Committee believes that section 355 was intended to permit the
tax-free division of existing business arrangements among existing
shareholders. In cases in which it is intended that new shareholders
will acquire ownership of a business in connection with a spin-off,
level disposition
the transaction more closely resembles a corporate
134
of the portion of the business that is sold.
Assume P spins off S as part of a plan where X will immediately thereafter acquire S for X stock representing less than 50% of X. Under
§ 355(e), P is deemed to have made a taxable disposition of the S stock.
See supra Part IV.B.3.d.
See supra Part I.
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-6 (as amended in 2001).
See, e.g., Sharon C. Mendelson, Section 355(d) Final Regulations Appropriately
Limit Expansive Statute, 14 J. TAX'N FIN. INSTS. 31 (2001).
134. H.R. REP. No. 105-148, at 213 (1997); S. REP. No. 105-33, at 139-40 (1997).
130.
131.
132.
133.
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Note that P would clearly be taxed if it had engaged in an economically
identical transaction, namely selling the S stock to X for X stock, and
paying a dividend of the X stock. The reasoning in favor of § 355(e),
however, is not that a taxpayer should be taxed whenever an alternative
transaction reaching the same result would be taxable. Rather, the focus
of § 355(e) is on General Utilities repeal, not on a complete recharacterization of the transaction by changing the order of the steps. Thus, the
section only taxes P, and not also the P shareholders as would be the case
in the alternative transaction.
The theory behind § 355(e) is that the combination of the spinoff and
the planned shift of ownership of S after the spinoff is in substance a
transfer by P of S to X that should be taxed following General Utilities
repeal. In other words, the S stock has left the P corporate solution, and
the economic ownership of S has left the P shareholder group. As a result, after General Utilities repeal, P should be taxed on the appreciation
in the S stock.
The argument in favor of § 355(e) is strengthened in some situations by
the fact that the tax-free treatment of P is inconsistent with general tax
principles. This is most clear where the P shareholders, at the moment
they receive the S stock, have a binding contract to transfer it to X. In
that case, the P shareholders have no separate indicia of ownership of the
S stock, and their transitory ownership of S stock should not be respected
for tax purposes. 135 Even in the absence of a binding contract at the time
1 37
of the distribution, Court Holding Co. 136 or step transaction principles
might apply to treat P as the transferor of the S stock.
Finally, after the decision in Cumberland Public Service,138 there was a
"shadowy and artificial" distinction between the situations when a corporation's distribution of assets to shareholders, followed by a shareholder
sale of the assets, would or would not be respected. 139 Shortly thereafter,
Congress eliminated the significance of the distinction by adopting
135. In Esmark v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 171 (1988), affd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989),
corporation X purchased P stock on the market and was required to transfer that stock to
P in exchange for all the S stock. P's transfer of S stock to X would be tax free to P only if
X's ownership of P stock was respected notwithstanding its transitory nature. The court
followed the form and upheld the tax-free treatment of P. This case appears inconsistent
with general principles of tax ownership. In any event, there is no policy reason that such
transitory ownership should be respected.
136. Court Holding Co. v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 331 (1945). See Rev. Rul. 96-30, 1996-1
C.B. 36 (indicating that the application of the case to a Morris Trust transaction depends on
all the facts and circumstances, but not applying the case to the facts in question).
137. The step transaction doctrine is notoriously vague and uncertain. It has been said
to apply if the "steps are in substance integrated, interdependent, and focused toward a
particular result." Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 (1987). The alternative formulations of the test ask whether there is a "binding commitment" to do the second step at the
time of the first, whether "the steps are so interdependent that the legal relations created
by one transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of the series," or
whether "a series of formally separate steps are really prearranged parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to reach the ultimate result." Id. at 1429-30.
138. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
139. Id. at 454-55.
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§ 337.140 Section 355(e) can be viewed as Congress's attempt to eliminate
an equally artificial distinction between a corporate sale on the one hand,
and a corporate distribution followed by a shareholder sale on the other
hand.
For these reasons, particularly the inconsistency of Morris Trust transactions with General Utilities repeal, I believe § 355(e) reaches the correct
policy result.14 1 This, however, is far from a majority view among those
writing on the subject. 142 Moreover, § 355(e) clearly has theoretical imperfections. Most notably, P is taxed on the distribution of S even if P
rather than S has the subsequent change of ownership. Conceptually, if P
has the change in ownership, S should be treated as if it had disposed of
the P assets to the acquiring corporation. This imperfection in § 355(e)
will result in overtaxation (or undertaxation) in the case where P has the
change of ownership if the appreciation in the P assets is less (or more)
than the appreciation on the S assets.
This imperfection, however, is not limited to § 355(e). Section
355(b)(2)(D) and 355(d) has the same problem. For example, if X buys
60% of P and P then splits off S in redemption of the other shareholders,
S should have a gain on the disposition of P. More significantly, the same
imperfection has always existed under the device and continuity of interest tests. Even if those tests are violated because of subsequent sales of P
stock rather than S stock, P is taxed on the appreciation in S stock, and
shareholders are treated as receiving a dividend of S stock rather than P
43
stock.

1

As a result, fixing this flaw in § 355(e) would logically require a rather
fundamental change in these other provisions as well. Difficult issues
would arise, including the consequences if both P and S had changes of
ownership. The approach now taken by all of these provisions is to follow the form of the distribution and to always tax P on the appreciation
in S. This is a reasonable simplification, although not theoretically
correct.
140. See BIITKER & EusT'cE, supra note 55, 10.05[5][a].
141. Cf George K. Yin, Morris Trust, Sec. 355(e), and the Future Taxation of Corp.
Acquisitions, 80 TAX NOTES 375 (1998) (arguing that I.R.C. § 355(e) has elements of a
mandatory I.R.C. § 338 election because gain is triggered as a result of the change of stock
ownership of P or S); Michael L. Schler, Yes to Section 355(e), No to Mandatory Section
338, 80 TAX NOTES 733 (1998) (letter to the editor) (agreeing with the theory expressed in
the text in favor of I.R.C. § 355(e), but claiming that I.R.C. § 355(e) has nothing to do with
mandatory I.R.C. § 338 because I.R.C. § 355(e) requires a double trigger, i.e., not only a
change in ownership of P or S but also a spinoff of S). This correspondence continued with
George K. Yin, Is Section 355(e) a Stalking-Horse for Mandatory Section 338?, 80 TAX
NOTES 865 (1998) (letter to the editor), and Michael L. Schler, The Section 355(e) Debate:
Round 4, 80 TAX NOTES 971 (1998) (letter to the editor).
142. See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form
and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L.
REV. 47, 63-64 (2001); Richard L. Reinhold, Section 355(e): How We Got Here and Where
We Are, 82 TAX NOTES 1485, 1493 (1999); Report No. 906, Report on Section 355 (N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n Tax Section) July 2, 1997, reprinted in 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 132-36 (1997)
[hereinafter NYSBA Section 355(e) Report].
143. See Sheffield & Schlunk, supra note 38, at 950.
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Moving beyond this imperfection in § 355(e), the adoption of § 355(e)
has itself resulted in simplification of § 355 in two respects. First, § 355(e)
was designed to prevent leveraged Morris Trust transactions that are the
equivalent of cash sales of assets with no tax to P or S.144 These transactions are universally considered abusive. 14 5 Absent § 355(e), a far more
complex provision would be necessary to stop them. In fact, the difficulty
of drafting such a provision may well have led to the existing version of
§ 355(e).
Second, when § 355(e) was adopted, there were many more restrictions
on a post-spinoff acquisition of S than on a post-spinoff acquisition of P.
For example, a preexisting commitment by a third party to acquire S after
the spinoff may have been viewed as causing P to fail to control S at the
1
time of the distribution of S. 46
Congress indicated in the legislative history of the Revenue Act of
1997147 and the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act
of 1998148 a desire to equalize the types of post-spinoff restructurings that
were permissible for P and S. Based on this legislative history, the IRS
announced that it would not apply step transaction principles to determine whether P met the control test for S before the distribution notwithstanding any post-distribution acquisition or restructuring of S.149
This principle is extremely broad. For example, P can apparently drop
assets to a newly formed S and spin off S,and (pursuant to a binding
contract) S can then merge into T in a tax-free "A" reorganization. Congress clearly intended § 355 to apply in this case. 150 This is quite extraordinary, since under general tax principles the existence of S is
transitory, and both P and the P shareholders would be subject to tax. It
is difficult to justify this result as a policy matter, 15 1 even though P could
spin off all of its assets other than the S assets in question and then be
acquired in a tax-free reorganization.
The distribution of transitory S,however, will be taxable to P under
§ 355(e) if the P shareholders end up with no more than a 50% economic
interest in S. This limitation is the only possible justification of the result
144. See supra Part II (final paragraph).
145. See, e.g., NYSBA Section 355(e) Report, supra note 142.
146. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 96-30, 1996-1 C.B. 36. The issue would not arise for a secondstep acquisition of P because such an acquisition would not call into question P's prior
control of S.
147. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-220, at 529-30 (1997).
148. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, 112 Stat. 685; see S. REP. No. 105-174, at 175-76 (1998), reprintedin 1998-3 C.B. 71112. See also STAFF OF J.

COMM. ON TAX'N, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX

LEGISLATION ENACTED IN

1998, at 189-91 (Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Blue

Book].

149. Rev. Rul. 98-27, 1998-1 C.B. 1159.
150. See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 175-76 (1998); 1998 Blue Book, supra note 148, at 190.
151. See Richard W. Bailine, The Vindication of Mrs. Gregory and Sundry Other Items,
29 J. CORP. TAX'N, July/Aug. 2002, at 31 (criticizing a private letter ruling that takes the
same position).
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in the preceding paragraph. As a result, the simplification of § 355 can be
attributed in part to the moderating influence of § 355(e).
To conclude, § 355(e) should remain in the Code. The underlying policy is correct, and it permits simplification of other aspects of § 355.
While in theory the amount of gain recognized on a spinoff should depend upon whether P or S has a change of ownership after the spinoff,
the more precise rule would lead to much additional unnecessary
complexity.
2.

The Regulations

Consider next the level of a "plan or series of related transactions" that
should be required to trigger § 355(e). This has been the subject of considerable controversy. I (along with many others) criticized the original
proposed regulations as being much too broad in their concept of a
plan. 152 An interim set of temporary regulations was relatively balanced. 153 The current regulations, however, have gone too far in the opposite direction and exclude from the plan concept certain transactions
that would normally be considered a plan. They state that § 355(e) can
apply to a distribution followed by an acquisition only if P (or S)and the
particular third party acquirer had "an agreement, understanding, arrangement, or substantial negotiations" for the acquisition by the date of
the distribution. 154 "Substantial negotiations" generally exist only if there
155
is discussion of "significant economic terms."
This rule exempts many post-spinoff acquisitions from § 355(e) that are
within the plain meaning of the statute, i.e., they fit within the ordinary
meaning of "plan or series of related transactions." Moreover, many of
these acquisitions should be covered in light of the purpose of § 355(e), as
expressed in the legislative history, to tax P on transactions that are more
like sales than divisions of a preexisting business. 56 Finally, the regulations require more of a preexisting agreement in order for § 355(e) to
apply as opposed to the rather loose standard for pre-spinoff negotiations
157
that might trigger the device test.
For example, under the regulations, § 355(e) would not apply even if,
by the time of the spinoff, P and X had "insubstantial" discussions for a
post-spinoff acquisition of S and the parties believed it was very likely
that negotiations would be successful after the spinoff. In fact, any
amount of discussions concerning the noneconomic terms of the acquisition are permitted before the spinoff. These terms include management
152. See Michael L. Schler, The Meaning of a 'Plan' Under Section 355(e), 85 TAX
913 and 85 TAX NOTES 1051 (1999).
153. T.D. 8960, 2001-2 C.B. 176.
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7T(b)(2), (h) (as amended in 2002).
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7T(h).
156. See Schler, supra note 152, at 921-22 for a discussion of legislative history.
157. "Substantial evidence of device" will "ordinarily" exist if "a sale or exchange was
discussed by the buyer and the seller before the distribution and was reasonably to be
anticipated by both parties." Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iii)(D) (as amended in 1989).
NOTES
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issues, which are often the most contentious. Apparently it would even
be permissible for P to solicit acquisition proposals (with offer prices)
from potential acquirers prior to the distribution, as long as P did not
respond to the proposals until after the distribution. Moreover, it is irrelevant that the expected success of the negotiations might be a motive for
the spinoff.
As another example, suppose P agreed with X that after P's spinoff of
S, X would acquire P, and the parties acknowledged that § 355(e) would
apply. After the spinoff is announced, however, Y makes a higher offer
for P and, without any discussions between P and Y before the spinoff, Y
ultimately succeeds in the acquisition. Under the regulations, § 355(e)
does not apply because Y's acquisition of P is not "similar" to X's proposed acquisition of P.158 This result is not justified by the policies behind § 355(e), since P had agreed to be acquired by the time of the
spinoff, and only the name of the acquirer was a surprise. Moreover, the
result is an unlevel playing field because only X is subject to § 355(e), and
thus any competing bidder is at an advantage.
In addition, under the IRS guidelines, a valid business purpose for a
spinoff is to facilitate a tax-free combination of P or S with another corporation.1 59 If that is the purpose of a spinoff, it is difficult to see why the
spinoff and combination should not be viewed as a single plan. This
problem would be exacerbated under the proposed loosening of the business purpose requirement.
Finally, § 355(e) would not apply to the examples in the preceding
paragraphs even if they involved a leveraged spinoff. It is especially difficult to justify the nonapplication of the section in these cases, since these
were the clearly abusive cases at which § 355(e) was most directly aimed.
Thus, the regulations should be modified to expand the definition of
"plan" to cover the situations discussed herein. It should be noted that
even some who generally support the new regulations have expressed
doubt about the full scope of the exemption from § 355(e) contained in
60
the regulations.'
C.

CASH RECEIVED FROM THE DISTRIBUTED SUBSIDIARY

In a spinoff, P often wishes to receive cash from S, or to have S assume
liabilities of P. The existing rules for these transactions are illogical in
certain respects, and depend upon whether the transaction is a pure § 355
distribution or is a divisive D reorganization.
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7T(h)(8).
159. Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-1 C.B. 696 app. A., §§ 2.07, 2.08.
160. See Letter from Samuel A. Dimon to Pamela F. Olson and Charles 0. Rossotti
(Oct. 28, 2002), (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Rep. No. 1020), available at http://www.
nysba.org/taxreports. But see Mark J. Silverman & Lisa M. Zarlenga, Fourth Time's a
Charm: New Anti-Morris Trust Regs Provide Helpful Guidance,96 TAX NOTES 983 (2002);
Robert Willens, IRS Revises the 'Plan' Concept in the 355(e) Temp. Regs. to Infuse More
Practicality,97 J. TAx'N 6, 19 (2002).
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1. Section 355 Distributions
Consider first a pure § 355 distribution. S can pay a cash dividend to P
or assume liabilities of P. Assuming P and S file a consolidated return,
the dividend or debt assumption will reduce P's basis in S.161 This will
not matter as long as the dividend and debt assumption do not exceed P's
basis in S, because this basis becomes irrelevant after the spinoff. However, to the extent the dividend and debt assumption exceed P's basis in
S, P will have an excess loss account (negative basis) in S, and this
1 62
amount will be treated as taxable gain at the time of the spinoff.
These rules raise a number of issues. First, suppose S issues new equity
to third parties consistent with P's retention of control of S. S then pays
the proceeds to P as a dividend, and P spins off S. Subject to the basis
limitation, P will not be taxed on the cash received even though the result
is economically identical to a sale by P of a portion of its preexisting S
stock to the third parties. This result may not be correct as a policy matter. The same issue arises, however, if P does not spin off S. Therefore,
the issue is not a spinoff issue.
Second, P may have debt that is not assumable as a legal matter, but
that P desires economically to shift to S. The same economic result can
be achieved, subject to the basis limitation, if S borrows directly and pays
a dividend to P, and P uses the proceeds to pay down its own debt. Thus,
S's ability to pay cash dividends to P, up to the basis limitation, is necessary to permit the equivalent of debt assumptions. This fact is relevant
163
for the discussion of divisive D reorganizations below.
Third, the basis limitation puts a great premium on the form of the
spinoff. Suppose P and S each has an active business worth $100, and P
has a $0 basis in S. If S borrowed $50 and distributed the cash to P, and
then P spun off S, P would have $50 of gain. If instead P borrowed $50,
retained the liability, contributed the $50 in cash and the entire P business to Newco, and then spun off Newco, P would have no tax. The two
transactions have the same economic result, but very different tax results.
It might be argued that the disparity in the preceding paragraph should
be eliminated, just as Congress eliminated the distinctions in post-acquisition restructurings of P and S.164 These disparities, however, could only
be avoided with a rule that, in the case of a spinoff, cash can be arbitrarily
moved between P and S without regard to P's basis in S.
Moreover, the issue is more pervasive since exactly the same disparities
arise under § 357(c) in a divisive D reorganization. Suppose P holds only
business A with liabilities in excess of its basis, and business B without
liabilities in excess of its basis. P will recognize § 357(c) gain if it contributes business A to S and spins off S, but not if it contributes business B to
S and spins off S. As a result, it would be impossible to eliminate all
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32 (as amended in 2002).
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-19 (as amended in 1997).

163. See infra Part V.C.2.
164. See supra Part V.B.1.
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disparities of the type under discussion without freely allowing the shifting of debt as well as cash between P and S prior to a spinoff.
In any event, P's receipt of a dividend from S (or S's assumption of P
debt) in excess of P's basis in S is similar to a taxable disposition of S at a
gain. P's failure to recognize gain in this case is inconsistent with General
Utilities repeal. As a result, the basis limitation is correct,1 65 notwith166
standing the disparities that are created.
2.

Divisive D Reorganizations

Consider now divisive D reorganizations. Section 361(b) deals with
cases in which P receives cash as well as stock from S in exchange for
assets transferred to S. If P retains the cash, it is treated as taxable
boot. 167 This means that the first dollars of retained cash are taxable to
the extent of P's gain on the contribution of assets to S. However, P is
not taxed on the receipt of the cash if it distributes the cash to its shareholders or creditors as part of the plan of reorganization. 168
Section 361(b) was substantially revised as part of technical corrections
legislation in 1986 and 1988.169 Before that time, boot received by P and
distributed to creditors of P would have been taxed to p.170 However,
the legislative history of the amendments does not focus on divisive D
reorganizations.171
Several aspects of these rules merit comment. First, contrary to these
rules, P should be able to receive cash from S to the extent of P's basis in
S without the recognition of gain, even if P does not distribute the cash to
its shareholders or creditors. In other words, retained cash should be
treated first as basis recovery rather than boot.
There are several reasons for this conclusion. It conforms the result of
a cash distribution to P in a divisive D reorganization to the result under
165. But see Sheffield & Schlunk, supra note 38, at 960 (suggesting that I.R.C. § 357(c)
(2002) might justifiably be scrapped in the spin-off context).
166. The basis limitation might not apply today in one situation where the parties file
consolidated returns. Suppose P has a positive basis in S, S owns all of T, and T borrows
cash in excess of S's basis and distributes the cash to S. S has an excess loss account in T.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-19. Suppose S spins off T to P, and P spins off T. Logically such
excess loss account should be taxable to P or S, since it represents cash received by the P/S
group from T in excess of its basis. Under § 1.1502-19(g) ex. 3, however, the excess loss
account disappears without any gain recognition. It is not clear whether the anti-abuse
rule in § 1.1502-19(e)(3) would apply in this case. This result should be changed for the
reasons stated in the text. Note that if I.R.C. § 355(e) applies to the second spinoff, then
§ 355(f) would cause the distribution of T to P to be a dividend rather than a spinoff, and
so this problem would not arise.
167. I.R.C. § 361(b)(1)(B) (2002).
168. I.R.C. § 361(b)(1)(A), (b)(3) (2002).
169. See BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 55, 12.42[2].
170. Id. T 12.42[1][b]; H.R. REP. No. 100-795, at 372 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 House
Report]; S. REP. No. 100-445, at 393 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Senate Report].
171. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 100TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF TECHNICAL
CORRECTIONS TO THE TAX REFORM ACT OF

1984

AND OTHER RECENT TAX LEGISLATION,

at 26-27 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 1986 Technical Corrections Blue Book]; 1988
House Report, supra note 170, at 372; 1988 Senate Report, supra note 170, at 393.
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§ 355. Moreover, P could achieve the same result if (a) P borrowed
against the assets up to the asset basis and then contributed the assets
subject to the debt, 172 or (b) P made a § 351 asset contribution to S, S
later paid a "separate" dividend to P, and P then spun off S under § 355.
Finally, the proposed rule would eliminate much unproductive structuring
that now takes place in divisive D reorganizations in order to avoid assets
moving "down" from corporation X to Y at the same time cash is moving
"up" from Y to X. Note also that the proposed rule is not entirely new,
but rather is an extension of the existing consolidated return
1 73
regulations.
Second, suppose the cash received by P exceeds P's basis in S, and P
retains the cash. P should have taxable gain to the extent of the excess,
just as under § 355. The same should be true if liabilities assumed by S
exceed P's basis in S. In both cases, P has a cash profit on the disposition
of S that should be taxed. This is so notwithstanding the fact that P could
avoid the gain through the spinoff of the non-S assets in an economically
174
equivalent transaction.
Third, suppose the cash received by P exceeds P's basis in S, and P
distributes the cash to creditors of P. Section 361(b) allows tax-free treatment to P without any basis limitation. Thus, if P and S do not file consolidated returns, P does not have taxable gain. If P and S file
consolidated returns, the better view is that the consolidated return regulations cause P to have taxable gain on the excess of cash over basis.1 75
There is no direct authority on this point, however.
P's distribution of the cash to its creditors is no justification for P's lack
of gain recognition when P receives cash from S in excess of its basis in S.
The rule in § 361(b) makes sense in the typical case of a nondivisive reorganization where P goes out of existence. Here, however, P continues to
exist. When P uses the cash to pay its debt, P's relief from liability is
economically identical to an assumption of P's liability by S, where the
172. In this case, I.R.C. § 357(b) would potentially apply to treat the liabilities assumed
by S as taxable boot. That provision applies if the principal purpose of the borrowing and
debt assumption was tax avoidance or not a bona fide business purpose. The provision is
not likely to apply if P waits a reasonable period of time between the borrowing and contribution, or if S ends up with a reasonable amount of debt on its books, particularly if the
effect is equivalent to an assumption of preexisting P debt. Rev. Rul. 79-258, 1979-2 C.B.
143.
173. In an intra-group reorganization, boot otherwise taxable under I.R.C. § 356 (2002),
as well as liabilities over basis otherwise taxable under I.R.C. § 357(c) (2002), are instead
treated as separate dividends. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(f)(3) (as amended in 2000); Treas.
Reg. § 1.1502 -80(d)(1) (as amended in 1997). However, these regulations do not apply if,
as part of the same plan, the transferor or transferee leaves the consolidated group, as
would be the case in a divisive D reorganization.
174. See supra Part V.B.1. for a discussion on this point.
175. Under I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (2002), P's basis in S would be reduced by cash received
from S to which I.R.C. § 361 (2002) applied. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-19(a)(2)(i) (as
amended in 1997), when a negative adjustment is made to P's basis in S under "the consolidated return regulations and other rules of law," the excess of such adjustment over P's
basis is an excess loss account. The excess loss account would be triggered on the
distribution.
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basis limitation applies. Likewise, P's payment of its debt is economically
similar to P's retention of the cash, most obviously if the debt is short
term debt or is otherwise close to its maturity date. Moreover, in contrast
to P's distribution of cash to its stockholders, P's distribution of cash to
its creditors will not be taxable to them.
As a result, P's use of the cash to pay down its debt should not preclude P from being taxed on the receipt of the cash in excess of basis.
The Clinton Administration proposed a basis limitation to § 361(b) for
the use of cash to pay creditors in a divisive D reorganizations. 176 However, no such limitation has been adopted.
Finally, suppose P receives cash in excess of its basis in S and distributes the cash to P stockholders. It may be argued that P should be taxed
on the excess cash in this situation as well, since P has extracted cash
from S and used the cash for the benefit of its stockholders. However,
the nontaxability of P in this situation is long standing. Moreover, the P
stockholders will be subject to tax on the cash. In the case where the cash
is distributed pro rata with the S stock, the result is no different than if S
had paid a dividend after the distribution. As a result, present law should
177
not be changed in this situation.
In conclusion, in a divisive D reorganization, (1) distributions from S to
P, or assumptions of P liability by S, should be treated as separate from
the contribution of assets to S; (2) such distributions should not be taxable to the extent of P's stock basis in S; and (3) any excess distribution
should be taxable to P to the extent the cash is retained by P or distributed to creditors of P. These rules would apply whether or not a consolidated return is filed.
D.

DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSIDIARY STOCK TO CREDITORS

Under § 355(c), P is not taxed on the distribution of appreciated stock
of S in exchange for debt securities of P. An earlier version of this rule
was first added to the Code in 1988,178 and there is no explanation for the
rule in the legislative history. 179 However, P receives an economic benefit when its liabilities are reduced. Moreover, this benefit arises when P
transfers S stock outside the P group.180 It is inconsistent with General
176. 2001 Budget Proposal, supra note 103, at 376-78.
177. Under the consolidated return rules discussed above, P would have an excess loss
account in the S stock for cash received in excess of its basis even if the cash was distributed to P shareholders. Such excess would be taxed to P on the distribution of S. This rule
is long standing and has nothing to do with P's use of the cash. It probably should not be
changed because of the complexities that would arise from a change.
178. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 1018(d)(5)(C), 102 Stat. 3342, 3580. Further technical corrections were made in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11,321(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 460-63.
179. 1988 House Report, supra note 170, at 373; 1988 Senate Report, supra note 170, at
394; H.R. REP. No. 101-894 pt.2A (1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-964, at 1141-42 (1990).
180. Note that I.R.C. § 355(e) would not apply to such a transfer of S stock because
that section disregards stock transferred to preexisting security holders of P. I.R.C.
§ 355(e)(3)(A)(ii) (2002). However, the continuity of interest rule requires sufficient S
stock to be held by former equity holders of P, and S stock distributed to P security holders
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Utilities repeal for P to avoid gain recognition when S stock leaves the P
group to benefit P in this manner. 18 1 This issue would become particularly significant with the liberalization of the business purpose test. As a
result, as part of the overall package, § 355(c) should be modified to
cause gain recognition in this case.
Consider next a divisive D reorganization. Under general principles, P
would recognize taxable gain on the distribution of appreciated property
to its creditors as part of the reorganization.18 2 Under § 361(c)(3), however, no gain is recognized to P on its distribution of S stock to its creditors in a divisive D reorganization. The creditors in this case need not
even hold securities of p.183 Recent private rulings have illustrated the
184
application of § 361(c)(3).
As noted above, § 361 was substantially revised in 1986 and 1988.185
Before that time, S stock distributed to creditors of P would have been
treated as disposed of by P in a taxable transaction.' 81 6 However, the legislative history of the amendments does not focus on divisive D
187
reorganizations.
Section 361(c)(3) makes sense in the typical case where P is going out
of existence, since P is merely a conduit for an acquiring corporation.
However, when P remains in existence, there is no more justification for
this result than for the tax free treatment of P under § 355(c) when P uses
S stock to redeem its securities. In fact, because the debt redeemed by P
under § 361(c)(3) need not even be a security, the result to P can be even
more inconsistent with General Utilities repeal than the result that arises
under § 355. Again, this issue would become particularly significant with
the liberalization of the business purpose test. As a result, as part of the
overall package, § 361(c)(3) should be amended to require P to recognize
gain on S stock distributed to any creditor of p.188
would not count towards this requirement. See Lewis R. Steinberg, Selected Issues in the
Taxation of Section 355 Transactions, 51 TAX LAW. 7, 8-10 (1997).

181. I.R.C. § 355(c) also provides tax-free treatment to P if it transfers S securities to
holders of P securities. However, if P received the securities as a dividend or as boot in a
§ 351 transaction, P would generally have a basis in the securities approximately equal to
their face amount. I.R.C. § 351 (2002). Moreover, the receipt of the securities would have
either been taxable to P or reduced P's basis in the S stock.
182. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-271, 1970-1 C.B. 166.
183. Note that I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) requires that former shareholders of P have 80%
control of S immediately after the distribution.
184. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-25-011 (Mar. 14, 2001); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-37-011 (June 4,

2001) (both allowing P's investment banker to buy debt of P (commercial paper in at least
one case) that was then redeemed for S stock as part of a divisive D reorganization); see
Jodi J. Schwartz, When You Assume ... Rearranging Liabilities in Corporate Reorganizations, THE TAX CLUB, at 46-48 (Nov. 19, 2001) (on file with author); Robert Willens, Lucent's Spin-Off of Agere Systems Breaks New Ground, 2 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Sept.

2001, at 3, 7-8.
185. BI-I7KER & EUS'TCE, supra note 55,
12.42[1], [2].
186. Id. 12.42[2][b] n.678; Rev. Rul. 70-271, 1970-1 C.B. 166.
187. 1988 House Report, supra note 170, at 372; 1988 Senate Report, supra note 170, at

393; 1986 Technical Corrections Blue Book, supra note 171, at 26-27.
188. I.R.C. § 361(c) (2002) also contains a technical flaw that should be fixed. Suppose
S is a preexisting subsidiary of P, P contributes additional assets to S for additional stock of

2003]

SPINOFFRULES
VI.

SECTION 336(e)

As noted above, 8 9 § 336(e) authorizes regulations to provide that if P
owns 80% of S, and P distributes the S stock, then an election may be
made to treat the distribution as an asset disposition, with no gain or loss
recognized on the stock distribution. For example, if P spins off S and the
transaction does not qualify under § 355, S would have gain on its assets,
instead of P having gain on the S stock. The result would be a stepped up
asset basis. The shareholders of P would continue to be treated as receiving the S stock in a taxable transaction.
This result is much fairer than at present, where P recognizes gain on
the S stock without any step up in the basis of the underlying S assets.
Regulations should be adopted, or the statute amended, to allow the election contemplated by § 336(e). 190
Note that the election should not be available if the distribution qualifies under § 355 but is taxable to P under § 355(d) or (e). In such a case,
the P shareholders are not taxed on the receipt of the S stock. A stepped
up asset basis is justified by analogizing the transaction to a taxable distribution of assets by P to the shareholders. The analogy does not arise,
however, in the absence of gain recognition to the shareholders.
VII.

OTHER ISSUES

A number of other more technical issues under § 355 also lead to considerable and unnecessary uncertainties. Many of these could be dealt
with by the Treasury Department and IRS, and would not require legislation. These issues include:
(1) the proper allocation of earnings and profits between P and S in a
§ 355 transaction;' 91
(2) the proper treatment of employees of P and S who have their former stock options on P stock converted into options on both P and S
1 92
stock after the spinoff;
(3) the application of the active trade or business test when P or S is a
193
partner of a partnership engaged in an active business;
S, and P spins off S to the P shareholders. Section 361(c) literally only protects P from
gain on the distribution of stock received by P in the reorganization. See I.R.C.
§ 361(c)(2)(B)(ii). Also, I.R.C. § 355(c)(1) (2002) does not apply because all the S stock is
distributed in the plan of reorganization. Thus, nothing literally protects P from gain on

the distribution of its preexisting stock in S. This result is clearly not intended and is not
followed by the IRS, but it has not been fixed despite having been pointed out many years
ago. See James S. Eustice, Section 361 Redux, 44 TAX NOTES 443, 444 (1989).
189. See supra Part III.

190. See Yin, supra note 37, at 652-57 (discussing issues that would arise in drafting
regulations under I.R.C. § 336(e)).
191. See Treas. Reg. § 1.312-10 (as amended in 1960); Bryan P. Collins et al., Allocation
of E&P in a Spin-Off by a Consolidated Group, 28 CORP. TAX'N, Nov./Dec. 2001, at 11.
192. See Rev. Rul. 2002-1, 2002-2 I.R.B. 268 (covering the simplest cases but not the

more typical and complex situations).
193. Numerous issues remain besides those recently resolved in Rev. Rul. 2002-49,
2002-32 I.R.B. 288. See GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 122, T 1004.5; Letter from Samuel
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(4) confirmation that the liquidation/reincorporation doctrine does not
apply when S merges upstream into P in an I.R.C. § 332 liquidation, and
P then drops some of the S assets into Newco and spins off Newco; 194 and
(5) when P is taxed on its distribution of S stock, and the P and S stock
is publicly traded, clarification of the proper method to determine the
195
value of the S stock in calculating P's gain.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

The principal proposals made herein, which are intended as a single
package, may be summarized as follows:
1. The business purpose test would be liberalized so as to be the same
as the test for a reorganization. A purely shareholder purpose would
continue to be prohibited, but enhancing shareholder value would be a
valid purpose. As an exception to this rule, however, a distribution would
automatically fail the business purpose test if the principal purpose (or
possibly "a" principal purpose) of the distribution were to facilitate taxable post-distribution sales of P or S stock by shareholders of P.
2. The device test would generally be retained in its present form but
would be modified as follows:
(a) The secondary business factor in the regulations would be
eliminated.
(b) When P is publicly traded, the device factor relating to stock sales
after the distribution would not apply to sales by nonmanagement shareholders owning less than 10% of P, unless facilitating such sales was a
principal purpose of the distribution.
Dimon to Pamela Olson and Charles 0. Rossotti (Apr. 19, 2002) (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax
Section, Rep. No. 1009), available at http://www.nysba.org/taxreports; Mark J. Silverman &
Steven B. Teplinsky, Letter to Pamela F. Olson, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
(Tax Policy), May 17, 2002, reprinted in 96 TAX NOTES 157 (2002).
194. This fact pattern often occurs in separating out the assets of a group that are to be
spun off. If the liquidation/reincorporation doctrine applied, S would have taxable gain
because it would be deemed to have distributed only a portion of its assets to P. However,
the IRS will now rule that § 332 applies to a liquidation of S into P followed by a
dropdown of some of the former S assets to Newco, as long as Newco is not an "alter ego"
of S. Rev. Proc. 2002-3, 2002-1 I.R.B. 117, § 4.01(24). That condition would virtually always be satisfied. Moreover, after the spinoff the assets end up in a corporation owned
directly by the P shareholders, which is more consistent with a complete liquidation of S
than with a liquidation/reincorporation of S.
195. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 574 (1995), affd, 162 F.3d 1236 (1999)
(P transfers property to a new partnership and transfers partnership units to its shareholders in a taxable § 311 distribution; held, amount of taxable gain to P on distribution is
based on price a third party would pay to P for all the partnership property, even though
this is different than the trading price of the partnership units which determines the
amount of the taxable dividend to the P shareholders); S. Tulsa Pathology Lab., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 118 T.C. 84 (2002) (P creates S and distributes S stock in purported divisive D
reorganization, and S shareholders sell all the S stock the same day in a prearranged sale;
held, the device test applies, and P has taxable gain based on the actual sale price of the S
stock, distinguishing Pope & Talbot); Tech. Adv. Mem. 200239001 (Jan. 22, 2002) (applying
Pope & Talbot to a deemed dividend of partnership interests).
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(c) In applying the device factor relating to assets that are not 5-year
business assets, assets acquired within 5 years under the business expansion doctrine would be treated as not being 5-year assets.
3. The control test would be changed to be the same test as the § 1504
test for consolidation (80% vote and value), without regard to the exclusion for foreign subsidiaries. Straight nonvoting preferred stock would be
disregarded, as under § 1504.
4. The active trade or business test would apply to the P controlled
group as a whole and the S controlled group as a whole after the distribution, rather than to P and S as separate corporations. The business expansion doctrine would likewise apply on a group basis.
5. In applying the active trade or business test to the P group and the
S group immediately after the distribution, a significant percentage (possibly 50%) of the assets of each group would be required to be active
trade or business assets that meet the existing 5-year tests. The 50%
threshold would be waived if the taxpayer received an advance ruling
from the IRS stating that the distribution did not violate the purposes of
the active trade or business test.
6. A new rule would tax P on a distribution if: (a) during the 5-year
period before the distribution, the P group acquired assets from outside
the group that are qualifying assets under the proposed 50% trade or
business test; (b) after the distribution those assets represent more than a
specified portion (e.g., 20% or 25%) of the then-value of the assets of P
or S; (c) P would be taxable on the distribution under the usual rules if
the assets in question were not qualifying assets under the 50% test; and
(d) based on all the facts and circumstance relating to the acquisition and
distribution, the tax-free treatment of P was inconsistent with the purposes of General Utilities repeal or the 50% trade or business test.
7. Section 355(d) and (e) would be retained as they are. The regulations under § 355(e) would be modified to expand the definition of "plan
or series of related transactions" in certain respects.
8. In a divisive D reorganization, (a) distributions from S to P, or assumptions of P liability by S, would be treated as separate from the contribution of assets to S; (b) such distributions would not be taxable to the
extent of P's stock basis in S; and (c) any excess distribution would be
taxable to P to the extent the cash is retained by P or distributed to creditors of P.
9. In a § 355 transaction or divisive D reorganization, P's use of S
stock to redeem any debt of P would be a taxable disposition of the S
stock, regardless of whether the debt was a security.
10. If a distribution of S stock would be taxable to both P and its
shareholders, the parties could elect under § 336(e) to have S treated as
selling its assets and receiving a stepped up asset basis.
It might be questioned whether the spinoff rules would be any simpler
if all of these reforms were enacted. In truth, the relevant sections might
not have fewer words than today. However, taxpayers dealing with spi-
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noffs would have a much easier time and the IRS would save an enormous amount of effort in processing private letter rulings. Moreover, the
requirements of spinoffs would be much more focused on the relevant
policies. As a result, the remaining efforts by both taxpayers, the Treasury Department and the IRS would be much more focused on legitimate
issues rather than arbitrary rules. In this sense, the spinoff rules would be
simpler.
IX.

PROFESSOR YIN'S COMMENTARY

Professor Yin has provided an extremely insightful and thoughtful
commentary on the foregoing discussion. 196 He correctly points out the
difficulty of reforming § 355 in the absence of broader reform of the stock
and asset acquisition rules of the Code. However, if piecemeal reform is
to occur, he generally agrees with the foregoing proposals concerning
business purpose, active trade or business, control, and § 336(e).
In addition, Professor Yin believes that the key to a permissible spinoff
is that the taxpayer not take advantage of the spinoff and dispose of part
but not all of the combined P business. Consequently, Professor Yin
would eliminate the continuity of interest test, "most or all" of the device
test, 19 7 and § 355(d). In their place, he would adopt a new and greatly
expanded version of § 355(e) (referred to as expanded § 355(e)). Violation of expanded § 355(e) would cause a distribution not to qualify under
§ 355, resulting in both corporate and shareholder-level tax.
Expanded § 355(e) would be violated if there was more than a specified change of ownership of P or S,possibly 50%, within a specified period of time before or after the distribution. Expanded § 355(e) would be
triggered by both taxable and nontaxable changes of ownership of P or S,
thus retaining the existing prohibition on Morris Trust transactions. 198
Most significantly, expanded § 355(e) would be triggered without regard
to whether the change of ownership was pursuant to a plan involving the
distribution. Rather, there would be an "irrebuttable presumption"' 99
that a change of ownership within the specified time period was part of
the same plan as the distribution.
In addition, Professor Yin acknowledges the need, in the absence of the
device test, to prevent planned dispositions of P or S stock that are too
small to trigger expanded § 355(e). He suggests a rule that any disposition (whether taxable or tax-free and even an "insignificant amount") of
P or S stock planned at the time of the distribution would disqualify the
entire distribution at both the corporate and shareholder levels.
196. George K. Yin, Taxing CorporateDivisions, 56 SMU L. REv. 289 (2003) [hereinafter Yin commentary].
197. Id. at 298.
198. 1 am extremely pleased that Professor Yin has now joined the half dozen people,
id. at 300, that agree with the policy behind I.R.C. § 355(e) to prevent Morris Trust transactions. His thoughtful explanation for his current view will hopefully increase the size of
our group by at least a few hundred percent.
199. Yin commentary, supra note 196, at 296.
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In response, no one could claim that the existing rules in the Code concerning taxable and tax-free corporate stock and asset acquisitions are
logical, consistent, or represent a uniform policy theme. However, these
rules have been in place since the beginning of the income tax and are
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. This is due to the unpredictable consequences of new rules, the lack of a political constituency for
fundamental reform, and the certainty that taxpayers would strongly object to "reforms" that would necessarily eliminate many existing structuring alternatives.
As a result, the practical choice is between incremental reform of Subchapter C or no reform at all. (The same could be said for much of the
Code.) Professor Yin is clearly correct that the results of incremental reform will be imperfect but still worthwhile.
Turn now to Professor Yin's proposals for incremental reform. As an
initial matter, I believe his expanded § 355(e) would not permit a great
amount of simplification. I believe it would still be necessary to retain
§ 355(d), 200 some of my new proposed restrictions, 20' and part of the de20 2
vice test.
More significantly, three rules contained in Professor Yin's expanded
§ 355(e) would change long-standing rules for spinoffs and would cause
considerable practical difficulties. These rules are discussed in turn
below.
Consider first the rule that violation of expanded § 355(e) would trigger shareholder as well as corporate-level tax. This may be correct as a
theoretical matter. It is also necessary if expanded § 355(e) is to replace

the device test. However, the proposed rule would reverse the 35-year
old Morris Trust decision as it relates to shareholder taxation, an issue not
affected by General Utilities repeal. Moreover, for whatever reason, Congress declined to go this far in 1986.
In addition, I believe Professor Yin greatly underestimates the practical
significance of this change. 20 3 For example, suppose there is little or no
gain to P on the distribution of S stock. Existing § 355(e) would not prevent the spinoff but expanded § 355(e) would do so. Alternatively, sup200. Professor Yin suggests that I.R.C. § 355(d) would be unnecessary because ex-

panded I.R.C. § 355(e) would apply to changes in ownership occurring for an appropriate

time period before and after a distribution. Id. at 299. However, any shortening of the 5year pre-distribution period for I.R.C. § 355(d) transactions would greatly undercut the
purposes of that section. On the other hand, a 10-year tainted period under expanded
I.R.C. § 355(e), i.e., from 5 years before the distribution until 5 years after the distribution,
would be far in excess of a period that could be justified for a per se rule of taxability.
201. For example, expanded I.R.C. § 355(e) might not cover certain acquisitions followed by spinoffs, e.g. example (c) in Part IV.E.3. If not, the rule described in Part IV.E.4
would still be necessary.
202. The device test would be needed for situations that do not involve a disposition of
stock and thus do not trigger even expanded I.R.C. § 355(e). For example, suppose P is
closely held, there is minimal business purpose for the spinoff, 49% of the assets of S after
the spinoff are cash equivalents, and the shareholders are willing to wait several years to
sell S. For another example, see the fact pattern discussed in Part IV.B.2.d.
203. See Yin commentary, supra note 196, at 301.
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pose there was significant corporate level gain but the parties believed
existing or expanded § 355(e) was unlikely to apply. The parties might be
willing to risk corporate-level tax under existing or expanded § 355(e),
but not shareholder-level tax under expanded § 355(e). This is especially
true if public shareholders are involved. Thus, the shareholder-level tax
under expanded § 355(e) could have significant effects in discouraging
spinoffs.
Second, consider the rule that expanded § 355(e) would be triggered by
any fifty percent change in ownership of P or S during the relevant time
period, regardless of the existence of a plan. This rule is analogous to
existing § 355(d), which is a per se rule that does not depend upon the
existence of a plan. It is also analogous to a few other Code provisions
that automatically treat a transaction as taxable if certain other events
04
2
occur within a specified period, regardless of the existence of a plan.

This rule may also be justified, as Professor Yin states, by the policy that a
taxpayer should not be able to obtain the tax benefits of both a spinoff
and a post-spinoff disposition of the stock of P or S, even in the absence
of a plan.
However, it is very unusual for the Code to take away the tax-free nature of a transaction solely because of the occurrence of a subsequent
transaction that was not planned at the time of the first transaction.
Moreover, this aspect of Professor Yin's proposal would squarely reverse
the spinoff rules that have existed since the 1920s. At no time has an
unplanned taxable or tax-free disposition of P or S stock following a distribution caused the distribution to fail to qualify as tax-free, either because of the device test or for any other reason.
Moreover, as a practical matter, in the case of a publicly held P, this
proposal would severely restrict the ability of a board of directors to engage in transactions that would otherwise be in the best interest of the
shareholders. After a change of ownership of P, it would severely limit
the ability of P or its acquirer to spin off S for unexpected business reasons. After a spinoff of S, it would severely limit the ability of P or S to
take advantage of unexpected opportunities to issue stock, to make taxfree acquisitions, or to be acquired on a taxable or tax-free basis. Likewise, following a spinoff of S, it would severely limit the ability of potential acquirers to acquire P or S on a taxable or tax-free basis.
Moreover, the proposal would allow any P to create a complete defense to any hostile takeover. P could drop down most of its assets to S
and spin off S, thus in effect immunizing both P and S from a takeover for
the length of the § 355(e) period. There is no good policy reason for P to
be able to use expanded § 355(e) as a tax shield in this manner.
204. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) (gain to contributing partner if contributed property

is distributed to another partner within 7 years of the contribution); I.R.C. § 737 (gain to
contributing partner that receives other property from the partnership within 7 years of the

contribution); Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-8(b)(3) (gain to U.S. transferor if transferee foreign
corporation disposes of transferred property within 5 years of the transfer).
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Third, consider the rule that expanded § 355(e) would apply if there
was a plan at the time of the distribution for any future taxable or taxfree change of stock ownership of P or S, no matter how small. It is
difficult to see a strong policy argument for this result. Moreover, this
proposal would reverse the spinoff rules that have existed since the 1920s.
This proposal would also have very severe practical effects. Many spinoffs today involve a plan to issue a relatively small amount of P or S
stock after the spinoff. Even more significantly, suppose a distribution
was in fact followed by any taxable or tax-free issuance or disposition of
P or S stock. The IRS could claim that a plan existed at the time of the
distribution and thus the distribution was fully taxable at both the corporate and shareholder levels. Even if there was not in fact a plan, P or S
might have great difficulty in proving this negative. As a result, any stock
issuance or disposition following a spinoff would cause enormous risks to
both P and the P shareholders. Few corporations would be willing to
engage in any spinoff under these circumstances.
To conclude, these three rules contained in expanded § 355(e) would
each reverse principles of the spinoff rules that have existed at least for
decades, and in some cases since the beginning of the income tax. Moreover, each would cause enormous practical difficulties for taxpayers. The
combined effect of these rules would be almost the equivalent of the outright repeal of § 355, at least for public corporations. It should be emphasized that no particular event has occurred in recent years that has
increased the justification for these rules as a policy matter.
Professor Yin may be right that these rules are theoretically correct.
These rules might also be appropriate in the context of overall reform of
the stock and asset acquisition rules of the Code. (An evaluation of these
propositions is beyond the scope of this article.) However, in recent decades Congress has done little more than tinker with § 355 and has implicitly approved of many of the policies that would be changed by these
rules. I view my proposals in the same way that Professor Yin views my
proposals, namely as a continuation of this incremental tinkering with an
imperfect statute.
In contrast, Professor Yin's proposals are much more far-reaching (and
restrictive). It does not seem appropriate to adopt them, or consider
adopting them, except in the context of much broader reform of the stock
and asset acquisition rules of the Code.
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